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THE PROBLEMATIC ROLE OF CRIMINAL LAW
IN REGULATING USE OF INFORMATION:
THE CASE OF THE ECONOMIC
ESPIONAGE ACT
GERALDINE SzOTr MOOHR*
The Economic Espionage Act ("EEA"), passed in 1996, makes
stealing or otherwise interfering in a trade secret a federal crime.
Congress abandoned the approach of most states that bases civil
and criminal trade secret laws on wrongful conduct, and justified
the EEA on the view that trade secrets are property. As a result,
under the EEA, more information qualifies as a trade secret, more
conduct triggers legal action, and it is easier to establish that a
trade secret exists. Unintended consequences of this enhanced
protection are likely to undermine achievement of Congress's
goals. The EEA is likely to restrain employee mobility, reduce the
creation of innovative products and ideas, and constrain economic
growth. The analysis shows that criminalizing takings of
information and information products is a difficult and complex
task, and the more judicious course is to protect the interests of
trade secret holders through civil law.
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INTRODUCTION
Current headlines chronicle a profound unrest in industries that
produce and distribute information, as powerful interests quarrel over
who "owns" the use of a song or a business secret. The winner gains a
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power that can be used to limit the rights of others to use and to
benefit from the information. Such control of information raises
significant public policy concerns because granting access to
information products can lead to future innovation, and limiting
access to them can stifle it.'
The best-known dispute about control of an information product
is the controversy over Napster, the Internet company that delivered
music to personal computers. The recording industry launched, and
won, copyright infringement suits against Napster, and succeeded in
effectively closing the company down.2 Other examples abound, such
as disputes involving the patenting of business methods,3 trademarks
1. Deciding upon a term to describe this subject matter and to navigate between
short-hand, conversational language and the precise terms that are mandated by
intellectual property law is not a simple matter. I use the term "information" or
"information product" throughout the Article. While imperfect, it serves here as an
umbrella term to include those intangible products that are the result of creating,
accumulating, and using knowledge and whose value is based on that content, rather than
on its medium.
Several other definitional difficulties emerge when the topic is intangible
information. The term "property" assumes what is often at issue-whether the
information object is property. Thus, using "property" obscures the real debate, the scope
of one's rights against others as to a specific, albeit intangible, interest. The term "owner"
is problematic for the same reason. In order to avoid these difficulties, I use the terms
"interests" and "holders." Cf. Stephen L. Carter, Does It Matter Whether Intellectual
Property is Property?, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 715, 716 (1993) (noting the universal habit of
talking about an owner as though the term had legal significance).
2. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004,1029 (9th Cir. 2001); UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352-53 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), cert.
denied; UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 2000 WL 710056 (S.D.N.Y. 2000);
Napster Settles Suits with Music Publishers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 2001, at B4 (reporting
that Napster executives would not predict when the site would reopen); Matt Richtel, Two
Record Labels Settle Copyright Suit with MP3.com, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2000, at Cl
(reporting the settlement that allows MP3, a music start-up Internet company, to store
consumers' record libraries and provide access to them over the Internet in return for
twenty million dollars and licensing fees); Matt Richtel, With Napster Down, Its Audience
Fans Out, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2001, at Al (reporting that the music industry has formed
alliances with former competitors to deliver music over the Internet and that several new
music-swapping sites provide Napster-like services).
The movie industry has followed the recording industry's strategy. See Universal
City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 346, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that a
program that can decrypt and copy DVDs violates the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
and permanently enjoining the posting of the program), affd, Universal City Studios, Inc.
v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2nd Cir. 2001); Matt Richtel, Movie and Record Companies Sue a
Film Trading Site, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2000, at C2 (reporting the filing of a copyright suit
against Scour.com, a venture the industries say permits the free trading of movies).
3. See Amazon.com, Inc. v. BarnesandNoble.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1249
(W.D. Wash. 1999) (granting Amazon.com's motion for preliminary injunction), vacated
by Amazon.com, Inc. v. BarnesandNoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Scott
Thurm & Rebecca Quick, Amazon.com is Granted an Injunction in BarnesandNoble.com
Patent Dispute, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 1999, at B5 (reporting the granting of a preliminary
856 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
on the Internet,4 photographs of professional basketball games,'
proposed database legislation,6 and even comic strips7 and college
professors' lecture notes.8
The disputes are not confined to the civil arena. Increasingly,
disputes over control of information products are the subject of
criminal actions. For example, in May 2000, a grand jury in Detroit
indicted a senior vice president of General Motors, who had accepted
a position with Volkswagen, on various charges for stealing trade
secrets.' In January 2001, the recording industry threatened a
Princeton professor with criminal charges.1° The tactic led the
injunction barring the use by BarnesandNoble.com of the patented one click check-out
system).
4. See Laurie J. Flynn, New Economy, Whose Name Is It Anyway?, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 4, 2000, at C3 (reporting that trademark owners are prevailing in their battle with
Internet domain addresses).
5. See Felicity Barringer, Times is Sued by N.B.A. Over Sale of Photos, N.Y. TIMES,
July 11, 2000, at Cl (reporting that the NBA is suing the newspaper over the sale of game
photographs to enforce terms printed on the back of press credentials that limit photos to
"news coverage").
6. See David E. Rosenbaum, Database Legislation Spurs Fierce Lobbying, N.Y.
TIMES, June 5, 2000, at A14 (reporting odd alliances and arguments concerning use of the
Internet to copy, repackage, and distribute factual databases). Real estate agents favor
protecting databases because it will safeguard their multiple listing services, but financial
information services oppose it because they use facts in databases to calculate stock
market trends. Id.
7. See John Sullivan, Charles Atlas Complaint Held as Legal Weakling, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 31, 2000, at B3 (reporting that a federal district court rejected the claim that a new
comic book based on Charles Atlas's classic advertising character, ironically once
advertised in comic books, had damaged the goodwill of Atlas's fitness centers).
8. See Georgia Holmes & Daniel A. Levin, Who Owns Course Materials Prepared by
a Teacher or Professor?: The Application of Copyright Law to Teaching Materials in the
Internet Age, 2000 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 165, passim; Jacques Steinberg, Boola, Boola: E-
Commerce Comes to the Quad, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2000, at WK1 (reporting that the
potential income from an Internet education firm raises the issue of who owns the
electronic rights to a professor's lectures and research).
9. See Keith Bradsher, Former G.M. Executive Indicted on Charges of Taking
Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2000, at C1. Jose' Ignacio Lopez de Arriortua, G.M.'s
former vice president for worldwide purchasing, was indicted for wire fraud and interstate
transportation of stolen property. Id. Lopez is currently fighting extradition from Spain.
See Emma Daly, Court Fight in G.M. Spy Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 22,2001, at Wi.
The long-running dispute between Avant and Cadence is another high-profle
case involving criminal law protection of trade secrets and copyright. See Criminal
Charges Against Avant Dismissed, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2000, at C2 (reporting that a
federal district court dismissed charges of theft of trade secrets); Howard Mintz, Jury Re-
Indicts Software Maker, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB. Bus. NEWS, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS,
Aug. 12,2000,2000 WL 25442791 (reporting that prosecutors secured a new indictment of
the firm and its officers).
10. See Amy Harmon, Group Says It Beat Music Security But Can't Reveal How, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2001, at C2 (recounting that Professor Felton would not reveal the results
of an experiment in testing the security of a digital music copyright system because doing
2002] CRIMINALIZING INFORMATION TAKINGS 857
professor to forego release of the research he and others had done
and thwarted a discussion of the results." In July 2001, the FBI
arrested a Russian computer software designer for writing a program
that enabled consumers to circumvent an encryption device. 2 The
program did not infringe any copyright, but it did violate a federal law
that makes it a crime to design software that might be used to infringe
a copyright.
3
Although the disputes implicate a host of legal doctrines,
common threads tie the stories together. The disputes involve
intangible objects-songs, photos, and confidential or secret business
information-that are all, at bottom, based on knowledge or
information. Most basically, the stories highlight a persistent and
perhaps irreconcilable problem: how to protect interests in
information without reducing too much the public's access to that
information. While failing to protect such interests may discourage
innovation, limiting public access may ultimately reduce production
of new knowledge and ideas.
New technology exacerbates this enduring problem. Information
products derive both additional value and vulnerability from
computer technology. It is now possible to create information
products that are entirely new,'14 to venture into new markets for
familiar information products, 5 and to create hybrid services. 6
so may subject him to criminal charges under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act); John
Markoff, Record Panel Threatens Researcher With Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2001, at
C4 (reporting that the Recording Industry Association of America threatened legal action
against Professor Edward Felton's research group if it presented a paper at an academic
conference); Felton v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of America, No. 01-CV-2669 (D.N.J. Nov.
28, 2001) (dismissing scientists' suit alleging that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
chills their rights to present research results because there is no present controversy).
11. See Harmon, supra note 10.
12. See Amy Harmon, New Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2001, at C4 (recounting
the arrest of a Russian programmer); Lawrence Lessig, Jail Time in the Digital Age, N.Y.
TIMES, July 30, 2001, at A17. The programmer was charged with violating the 1998
Digital Millennium Copyright Act that outlaws technologies designed to circumvent codes
that protect copyrighted material. Lessig, supra.
13. See Harmon, supra note 12; Jennifer 8. [sic] Lee, In Digital Copyright Case,
Programmer Can Go Home, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2001 at C4 (reporting that authorities
are allowing Dmitri Sklyarov to return to Russia after being detained for five months);
Lessig, supra note 12.
14. The technology is itself a kind of information product, and is the best example of
new products now available.
15. Consider, for example, on-line newspapers, sports channels, and electronic books.
See Doreen Carvajal, Long Line Online for Stephen King E-Novella, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16,
2000, at Al; David D. Kirkpatrick, Stephen King Sows Dread in Publishers with his Latest
E-Tale, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2000, at Cl (recounting how Stephen King, a popular
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Delivering digitized information products through the Internet lowers
distribution costs, which often leads to increased profits and the
stimulus to produce more.17 While digitization, Internet transactions,
and the allure of cyberspace expand the potential market for, and the
value of, information-based products, the same technology also
makes these products vulnerable to illicit use and theft. The market
value of an information product can be destroyed in the instant it
takes to send digitized information to another computer. Indeed,
estimated values of such losses are legion. 8 Technological advances
add another layer of concern; new technology must itself be nurtured
and protected, but again, without unduly privileging existing products
and thus closing off avenues for future innovation.
Is there a role for criminal law in finding and maintaining the
balance between encouraging innovation and maintaining access? If
so, what is it? Both Congress and courts have answered the first
question affirmatively; criminal law has a role to play.' 9 Courts have
novelist, sold a thriller over the Internet, an act that eliminates the traditional publishing
house and could increase his profits).
16. An example of a hybrid product is software that makes it possible to download
music and video files from the computers of fellow subscribers. See Clay Shirky, Freedom,
One Song at a Time, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2000, at A13 (noting that this type of software
delivers one song at a time, which enables consumers to assemble a music library
consisting only of preferred songs, freeing them from the industry's ten-track format).
17. The contribution of electronically delivered information products to general
economic well-being is now universally acknowledged. See, e.g., Paul Krugman,
Reckonings: Dynamo and Microchip, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2000, § 4, at 13 (stating that
the productivity boom since 1996 is the result of technology); Robert J. Samuelson,
Puzzles of the 'New Economy,' NEWSWEEK, Apr. 17, 2000, at 49 (describing a White
House conference that credited technological advances with raising living standards).
The phrase "information-based economy" has become little more than a dated
axiom. Cf. JOHN NAISBrrr, MEGATRENDS 1-33 (1984) (identifying the information-
based economy as a major societal transformation).
18. See infra note 248 (providing estimates of losses of up to one hundred billion
dollars annually); infra notes 248-50 and accompanying text (noting the infirm basis of
such estimates).
19. This Article emphasizes the use of criminal law; however, legislators and courts
have also been active in civil law.
Congress has amended existing statutes and passed new laws that strengthen and
create property rights in information. See, e.g., Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3347 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914
(2000)) (extending copyright protection to maskworks); Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act and Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat.
2827 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000)) (extending the copyright term to the life of the
author plus seventy years).
Judicial decisions involving civil causes of action have expanded existing doctrines
to grant property rights in intangibles. See Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of
Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REv. 2187, 2234 (2000)
(noting the judicial trend to strengthen rights that attach to intellectual property); Wendy
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allowed prosecutors to use general federal criminal laws,20 and
Congress has recently enacted specific criminal statutes'
One of Congress's recent and most significant initiatives is the
Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA), which makes
misappropriating a trade secret a federal crime? 2 Passage of the EEA
presents an opportunity to consider generally the basis for and
consequences of relying on criminal law to regulate use of
information. The aim here is to identify the consequences of using
criminal law to regulate use of trade secrets and to consider whether
the EEA maintains a balance between stimulating the creation of
information products and securing efficient use of the information.
The analysis reveals that the EEA creates a broad, expansive federal
law of trade secrets-a new kind of trade secret law-that rests upon
a property basis. This combination is likely to produce unintended
consequences that tilt the balance toward stimulating creation and
away from effective use of information. Ultimately, this choice may
undermine Congress's purpose in enacting the statute.
Throughout this Article, the new federal law of trade secrets is
measured against trade secret doctrine, which is based on the
J. Gordon & Sam Postbrief, On Commodifying Intangibles, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 135,
137-38 (1998) (book review) (characterizing courts as "pro-property").
20. I have considered elsewhere the application of traditional general criminal laws,
mail fraud, wire fraud, and the National Stolen Property Act, to intangible interests. See
Geraldine Szott Moohr, Federal Criminal Fraud and the Development of Property Rights,
2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 683, passim. I concluded that the use of such statutes was
inappropriate and recommended that prosecutors confine their enforcement efforts to
specific criminal laws, such as the Economic Espionage Act. Id. at 738. This Article
continues that inquiry with reference to a specific, rather than a general, federal crime.
21. See, e.g., Copyright Felony Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-561, 106 Stat. 4233
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2000)) (amending the penalties for criminal copyright
infringement); Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) (expanding the scope of
criminal penalties for infringement); No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147,
111 Stat. 2678 (1997) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2000)) (amending the
criminal copyright infringement provisions); Anti-Bootlegging Law, Pub. L. No. 103-465,
§ 513(a), 108 Stat. 4809, 4974 (1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000)) (providing
criminal penalties for the unauthorized sale of recordings and videos of live musical
performances); Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat.
1213 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000)) (prohibiting the unauthorized use
of computers).
State legislators have also utilized criminal laws. See generally Eli Lederman,
Criminal Liability for Breach of Confidential Commercial Information, 38 EMORY L.J.
921, 947-65 (1989) (surveying state criminal laws dealing with trade secrets and
information); infra notes 113-25 and accompanying text (reviewing state criminal laws that
protect trade secrets).
22. Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488 (codified at
18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (2000)).
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common law and administered by the states.23 Accordingly, after
briefly introducing the EEA in Part I,24 a review of trade secret
doctrine in Part II places the new law in context. That review
considers the scope of protection given secret information and finds
that trade secret law confers only a limited right. Moreover,
ascertaining whether information is a trade secret is a fact-intensive
and somewhat circular exercise. In Part III, an analysis of specific
provisions of the EEA shows that-in contrast to common law-the
new federal law of trade secrets offers broad protection to holders of
such information while retaining the problematic aspects of defining a
trade secret.26 Under the EEA, more information is considered a
trade secret, and a greater range of conduct with respect to secret
information is barred. In Part IV, the analysis returns to common law
in order to identify and evaluate the conceptual bases for protecting
the interests of those who hold trade secrets2 7 Common law bases
trade secret protection on wrongful conduct, whereas Congress rests
the EEA on a property conception.
Part V addresses the consequences of creating a broad law of
trade secrets that ignores the historical basis of trade secret law and
key characteristics of the common law doctrine.' The analysis
indicates that enhanced property rights in trade secrets, enforced
through criminal sanctions, are likely to reduce movement of
employees between firms. Not only does this have profound effects
on experienced workers and regional economies, but the reduction in
employee mobility closes one path through which information enters
the public domain. In addition, use of a criminal statute is likely to
chill second-generation innovation and create a perverse incentive for
firms to rely less on the protection of patent law, which benefits the
public by requiring holders to reveal information and knowledge. In
the end, expanding and strengthening trade secret protection may
cause less information to reach the public domain, which discourages
innovation. For these reasons, this Article concludes that the EEA
may ultimately constrain, rather than encourage, innovation and
economic well-being. The larger lesson, outlined in Part VI,29 is that
23. "Common law" is used here to refer to judicially-created law and to state statutes
because generally states codified their common law. See infra notes 59-112 and
accompanying text (discussing state laws).
24. See infra notes 30-58 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 59-125 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 126-170 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 171-261 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 262-318 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 319-38 and accompanying text.
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it is wiser to legislate with a presumption against criminal penalties
when dealing with information and information products. Civil
enforcement is more likely to produce a nuanced solution that takes
into account the rights of others and established public policies.
Finally, the analysis suggests that it may be time to consider a federal
civil law of trade secrets in order to ensure that trade secret
protection is consistent with the policy that underlies intellectual
property laws.
I. THE ECONoMIc ESPIONAGE ACT
The Economic Espionage Act is significant both as a trade secret
law and as a criminal law ° It is the first federal legislation to deal
directly with trade secrets in the private sector.3 1 Rather remarkably,
injured parties have no federal civil cause of action for the loss of a
trade secret. Until now, plaintiffs with trade secret claims were
confined to state courts. 2
30. Several commentators have written about the EEA." See, James H.A. Pooley et
al., Understanding the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 5 TEX. INTELL. PROP. LJ. 177,
196-97 (1997) (characterizing the EEA as a "major shift in the balance traditionally struck
between intellectual property owners and competitors"); see also Kent B. Alexander &
Kristen L. Wood, The Economic Espionage Act Setting the Stage for a New Commercial
Code of Conduct, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 907, 939 (1999) (arguing that the EEA "tightened
a seam in the existing patchwork" of intellectual property law); Ronnie Heather Brandes
et al., Intellectual Property Crimes, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 657, 659-63 (2000) (outlining
the provisions of the EEA); Chris Carr et al., The Economic Espionage Act: Bear Trap or
Mousetrap?, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 159, 209 (2000) (arguing that the government's
narrow application of the EEA has limited its influence); Victoria A. Cundiff, The
Economic Espionage Act and You, 490 PLI/Pat 9, 27 (1997) (discussing the enforcement
difficulties under existing criminal laws); Arthur J. Schwab & David J. Porter, Federal
Protection of Trade Secrets: Understanding the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 10 J.
PROPRIETARY RTS. 2,3-8 (1998) (outlining the provisions and ambiguities of the EEA).
Only a few cases have resulted in reported opinions. See United States v.
Krumrei, 258 F.3d 535, 536 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Martin, 228 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.
2000); United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 191 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v. Yang, 74 F.
Supp. 2d 724, 725 (N.D. Ohio 1999); United States v. Hsu, 40 F. Supp. 2d 623, 631 (E.D.
Pa. 1999). According to a database maintained by attorney Mark Halligan, as of June 1,
2001, the government brought EEA charges in thirty cases. See R. Mark Halligan,
Reported Criminal Arrests and Convictions under the Economic Espionage Act of 1996,
at www.execpc.com/-mhallign/indict.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2002) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
31. Trade secrets owned by the federal government are governed by 18 U.S.C. § 1905,
which forbids government employees from disclosing confidential government
information, including trade secrets. See Hsu, 155 F.3d at 194 n.5 (noting the "limited
value" of § 1905 because it does not apply to private sector employees).
32. As to federal criminal law, taking a trade secret may be prosecuted as mail or wire
fraud. See §§ 1341, 1343.
In some circumstances, violations of federal offenses or state criminal trade secret
laws may implicate the federal civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
862 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
For the first federal initiative in trade secret law to be a criminal
statute, rather than a civil statute, is, in itself, worthy of note. Modem
federal regulatory law normally includes both civil and criminal
provisions, a practice that allows the development of standards
through civil law, which eventually supports criminalization. 31 In this
case, however, Congress moved directly and only to criminal
enforcement. In addition, Congress addressed thefts of trade secrets
even though no federal law prohibits theft of physical property in the
private sector.34 Moreover, the new statute criminalizes conduct that
traditionally has been treated as a civil violation under state law,35
plus some conduct that would not give rise to either a civil or criminal
cause of action.
3 6
A. The Comprehensive Approach of the EEA
The EEA establishes a comprehensive and systematic scheme
that uses criminal law to protect trade secrets.37 The EEA's definition
(RICO). See § 1964(c). Plaintiffs may file a civil suit for treble damages when the conduct
violates a state law that serves as a predicate act for a RICO violation. See, e.g., Religious
Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1084 (9th Cir. 1986) (recognizing civil RICO
claims for the state crime of stealing trade secrets); Cont'l Data Sys., Inc. v. Exxon Corp.,
638 F. Supp. 432, 437 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (recognizing civil RICO claims based on state trade
secret law); Fleet Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 627 F. Supp. 550, 559
(C.D. I1. 1986) (recognizing a civil RICO claim based on the loss of information in
violation of mail and wire fraud). See generally Thomas P. Heed, Comment,
Misappropriation of Trade Secrets: The Last Civil Rico Cause of Action That Works, 30 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 207 (1996) (proposing that victims of trade secret theft use civil
RICO provisions).
33. Insider trading and environmental laws are examples of this "sequentially
interactive" relationship between civil and criminal laws. See John C. Coffee, Does
"Unlawful" mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in
American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 201 (1991) (suggesting that criminal enforcement is
appropriate at the point civil law standards "harden" into a community norm).
34. The federal criminal code generally protects only government property from theft
and conversion. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 641; see also Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S.
246, 270 (1952) (overturning a conviction for stealing government property due to a lack
of criminal intent).
35. See United States v. Hsu, 40 F. Supp. 2d 623, 626 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (noting that the
EEA criminalizes "conduct that heretofore was thought best left to the civil law of unfair
competition").
36. See infra notes 126-70 and accompanying text (presenting specific provisions of
the EEA).
37. See United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 202 (3d Cir. 1998) (concluding that the
great weight of the EEA's legislative history evinces an intent to create a comprehensive
solution to economic espionage); see also S. REP. No. 104-359, at 11 (1996) (underscoring
the importance of developing a systematic approach); H.R. REP. No. 104-788, at 7 (1996),
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021, 4025 (stating that the EEA is designed to provide a
"systematic approach" and a comprehensive federal criminal statute); Statement by
President William J. Clinton Upon Signing H.R. 3723, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
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of a trade secret is considerably broader than the conception used at
common law or contained in state civil and criminal statutes. This
point is explored in some detail in Part 111,38 and it is sufficient here to
note that the statute broadens the range of protected information,
both explicitly and by making it easier to establish that a trade secret
exists. The EEA also reaches a greater range of conduct by barring,
in effect, any act that exceeds uses authorized by the holder.
In addition to protecting a wide variety of information and to
prohibiting a broad range of conduct, including attempt and
conspiracy to take a trade secret,39 the EEA also reaches third parties
who receive such information. 4° Under the EEA, anyone who
receives, buys, or possesses information with knowledge that it was
stolen or misappropriated is subject to criminal sanctions.41 Third
parties also may be reached through the conspiracy provision.42
Even as a federal felony, the EEA exacts severe punishment.
Individual violators of the general provision face fines and
imprisonment for up to ten years; organizations may be fined as much
as five million dollars.43 In contrast, federal crimes that address
similar pecuniary harms, such as fraud, carry a maximum penalty of
five years in prison.44  The criminal provisions of copyright
infringement provide for graded punishment up to five years for a
first offense.4 5 Patent infringement is not a criminal offense, and the
criminal provision governing federal government trade secrets is a
misdemeanor.46
4034, 4034 (stating that the "Act establishes a comprehensive and systematic approach to
trade secret theft").
38. See infra notes 126-44 and accompanying text.
39. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1832(a)(4)-(a)(5) (2000).
40. I& § 1832(a)(3).
41. I&
42. Id. § 1832(a)(5).
43. Id § 1832(a)-(b). The maximum fine for individual offenders is $250,000, the
same as for mail and wire fraud. Id. § 3571(d) (providing the general fine provision).
Penalties for violations that benefit foreign governments, instrumentalities, or
agents carry a penalty for individuals of fines up to $500,000 and imprisonment not more
than 15 years. I&. § 1831(a). When the defendant is an organization, the fine may reach
$10 million. Id. § 1831(a)-(b).
In large part, the Sentencing Guidelines assign the term of imprisonment. U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 (2001). The prison term is affected by the
value of what was taken and whether the conduct involved a breach of trust. U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B5.3(b) (2001); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 3B1.3 (2001).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 1341,1343.
45. Id. §2319(b)-(c).
46. Id. § 1905.
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Complementing the penalty provision, the EEA authorizes both
mandatory and discretionary forfeiture that includes proceeds of the
crime and any personal property used in the commission of the
crime.47 Notably, the EEA does not displace other laws that deal with
trade secrets; federal prosecutors may charge offenders with the full
range of relevant crimes and state prosecutors may also charge actors
under state criminal laws. 4
B. Passage of the EEA
In drafting and debating the Economic Espionage Act, Congress
and the President expressed concerns that the loss of American
intellectual capital jeopardized the country's economic well-being.49
Testimony of interested parties 0 revealed that commercial espionage
47. Id. § 1834(a). Restitution may also be required. Id. § 3663A (requiring restitution
for any property offense in which an identifiable victim suffers a pecuniary loss).
48. Id. § 1838 (stating that the EEA does not preempt or displace other civil or
criminal remedies on either the state or federal level).
Administrative provisions of the Act protect whistleblowers and authorize extra-
territorial application. Id. §§ 1833, 1837. Congress encourages reporting by authorizing
trial courts to preserve confidentiality of the trade secret. Id- § 1835; see United States v.
Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 198 n.15 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that the court is not determining
whether documents containing trade secrets must be disclosed to the defendant when the
charge is actual theft and stating that the issue is complex because actual content of a trade
secret may not be material to its existence); Joel M. Androphy et al., Criminal
Prosecutions of Trade Secret Theft: The Emergence of the Economic Espionage Act,
Hous. LAW., July-Aug. 2000, at 16, 18 (pointing out the tension between § 1835 and
defendants' rights to obtain documents that are material to the preparation of the case).
Although the EEA authorizes the Attorney General to bring a civil suit for
injunctive relief, 18 U.S.C. § 1836, it does not authorize a civil cause of action by
individuals. See cf. Computer Abuse Amendments Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-322, 108 Stat.
2098-99 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2000)) (authorizing private civil suits).
49. See Statement by President William J. Clinton Upon Signing H.R. 3723, reprinted
in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4034, 4034 (stating that the ultimate purpose of the EEA is to
safeguard the nation's security and economic strength by protecting the intellectual capital
of American businesses).
50. Congress did not hear testimony from practitioners or scholars from the
intellectual property community. Craig L. Uhrich, The Economic Espionage Act-Reverse
Engineering and the Intellectual Property Public Policy, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REv. 147, 170-71 (2001), available at http://www.mttlr.org/volseven/uhrich.html (noting
that witnesses were confined to industry representatives and did not include less self-
interested representatives, such as practitioners and scholars); see also Daniel C. Richman,
Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA
L. REV. 757, 776 & n.88 (1999) (suggesting that the EEA may be the result of
concentrated interest group power deployed to criminalize conduct).
This legislative focus on industry representatives may not be unusual. See Jessica
D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 857,
870 (1987) (stating that credit for the substance of the 1976 Copyright Act "belongs more
to the representatives of interested parties negotiating among themselves than to members
of Congress"); Lanier Saperstein, Comment, Copyrights, Criminal Sanctions and
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by foreign entities, often allies, represented the greatest threat to that
investment.5 1  Testimony emphasized the losses sustained by
American business because of information theft, and Congress noted
the enormous value of lost information.52
Having established the severity of the threat, Congress
concluded that existing federal criminal laws were not adequate to
address the danger. Indeed, although prosecutors may use federal
criminal fraud and transportation statutes against interferences with
trade secrets and confidential information,53 the statutes do not
invariably apply to information products. Written with tangible
property in mind, general federal fraud and transportation offenses
may not encompass thefts of trade secrets.54 Congress also concluded
Economic Rents: Applying the Rent Seeking Model to the Criminal Law Formulation
Process, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1470, 1474 (1997).
51. Congress heard evidence indicating that foreign companies and their
governments, especially allies, were actively engaged in acts of industrial espionage. S.
REP. No. 104-359, at 7 (1996) (recounting the 1992 testimony of Robert Gates, Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency, and the 1995 report of the National Counterintelligence
Center detailing the threat of foreign economic espionage). Testimony drew parallels
between industrial espionage and cold war military espionage. Id.
52. H.R. REP. No. 104-788, at 6 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021, 4024
(reporting that losses could amount to sixty-three billion dollars annually). The figure was
based on a survey by the American Society for Industrial Security, which also reported a
323% increase in reported incidents since a similar survey four years ago. See also 142
CONG. REc. S12,211-12 (1996) (statement of Sen. Kohl) (adopting estimate of $63
billion); Economic Espionage: Joint Hearing Before the Select Comm. on Intelligence
United States Senate and the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Technology, and Government
Information and of the Comm. on the Judiciary United States Senate, 104th Cong. 2 (1996)
(statement of Sen. Specter) (estimating a loss of $100 billion).
The press has also reported large estimated losses. Don Clark, Steps by Music
Industry to Halt Internet Piracy May Be Futile, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2000, at A3
(reporting a prediction that record companies will lose $3.1 billion annually in potential
music sales by 2005 and book publishers will lose $1.5 billion by 2005); House Judiciary
Panel Backs Stiffer Penalties for Economic Spying, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 1996, 1996 WL-
WSJ 11798048 (stating that estimated losses may exceed $24 billion); Paul Lewis, The
Artist's Friend Turned Enemy: A Backlash Against the Copyright, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8,
2000, at A17 (recounting that in 1996 the cost of foreign piracy of film, music, business
software, and books reached $10 billion) (citing MICHAEL P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE
DIPLOMACY (1998)).
53. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1342 (2000) (imposing federal criminal liability for mail fraud
and wire fraud); Id. § 2314 (National Stolen Property Act). These offenses are predicate
acts for charges under RICO. Id. § 1962.
54. United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 194-95 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that criminal
laws such as the National Stolen Property Act and mail and wire fraud have limited
applicability to theft of trade secrets); see also Peter J. Toren, Internet: A Safe Haven for
Anonymous Information Thieves, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 647, passim (1996)
(listing problems in using existing federal criminal laws to prosecute hypothetical theft of
trade secret); cf. Moohr, supra note 20, at 722-30 (explaining why statutes written to
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that state criminal laws were inadequate because state offenses are
not uniform, do not cover the full range of trade secret theft, fail to
deter because of their low penalties, and present jurisdictional
problems.5 5 For all of these reasons-and the reflexive impulse of
legislators to rely upon criminal laws-the Act easily passed. 6
The EEA encompasses two types of industrial espionage. First,
the Act bars espionage by or for the benefit of foreigners.17 Focusing
on economic espionage by other countries, this provision reflects the
ostensible motivating force for the legislation. Notwithstanding the
emphasis in both chambers on the threat to American industries from
abroad, the EEA also includes a second, general provision that makes
it a federal crime for anyone to steal or convert a trade secret.58 The
general provision, which applies to all who engage in the prohibited
conduct, creates a new federal law of trade secrets and is the focus of
this analysis.
To understand the full implications of the EEA, a review of the
common law of trade secrets is in order. Following that review, the
discussion turns to a more detailed analysis of the principal elements
of the Economic Espionage Act in Part HI.
II. THE COMMON LAW OF TRADE SECRETS
Although trade secret law is a newcomer by common law
standards, it comes with respectable credentials.59 Holders of trade
protect tangible property and money should not be applied to infringements of intangible
property).
55. S. REP. No. 104-359, at 11 (1996) (noting that state civil and criminal laws protect
information "only haphazardly").
56. Joseph F. Savage, Jr. et al., Trade Secrets: Conflicting Views of the Economic
Espionage Act, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2000, at 8, 11 (noting that the EEA garnered bipartisan
support and "breezed through Congress").
57. § 1831 (stating that this provision is entitled, "Economic espionage"). The
provision requires that the person engaging in the prohibited conduct do so "intending or
knowing that the offense will benefit any foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or
foreign agent." Id.
58. Id. § 1832 (stating that this provision is entitled, "Theft of trade secrets"). The
legislative history does not explain this deviation from Congress's purpose. See Pooley et
al., supra note 30, at 187 (suggesting that the bill was rewritten because of concerns that
limiting the law to espionage by foreign entities might violate international trade
agreements). The Senate had drafted two separate bills, S. 1556 (dealing with general
economic espionage) and S. 1557 (dealing with foreign government-sponsored theft). S.
REP. No. 104-359, at 7 n.1 (1996). These bills were apparently combined late in the
legislative process. In the House, the general provision that prohibits all thefts of trade
secrets was added to a bill introduced by Congressman Bill McCollum on June 26, 1996.
Schwab & Porter, supra note 30, at 3.
59. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. a (1995) (referring
to origins in Roman law); ALLISON COLEMAN, THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF TRADE
[Vol. 80
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secrets have sought the protection of common law since the
eighteenth century, 60 and a Massachusetts court recognized limited
rights in secret information in 1837.61
As commonly understood, a trade secret is "[a]ny device, method
formula, etc., known to the manufacturer who uses it but not to his
competitors."62  When someone takes a trade secret by wrongful
means or in breach of a duty, the holder may sue that person for
damages and injunctive relief. Despite its lineage and the familiarity
of that common understanding, trade secret doctrine is less than
straightforward.
A. The Paradox of Trade Secrets
Common law courts created a unique and limited right in secret
information. Most fundamentally, one who holds a trade secret does
not have a guaranteed right to the exclusive use of the secret.63
Rather, the holder's right to sue is triggered only when the secret is
SECRETS 93 (1992) (noting the Hammurabic Code of 2100 B.C. provided for the loss of an
eye to one caught prying into forbidden secrets) (citing Fetterley, Historical Perspectives
on Criminal Laws Relating to the Theft of Trade Secrets, 25 BUS. LAW. 1535, 1535 n.3
(1970)).
60. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. a (1995) (reciting
history); SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION
137-38 (1989) (recounting the efforts of eighteenth-century manufacturers to protect the
process for making porcelain); 1 MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 2.01-2.02, at
2-2 (1990) (recounting the development of trade secret law); Miguel Deutch, The Property
Concept of Trade Secrets in Anglo-American Law: An Ongoing Debate, 31 U. RICH. L.
REV. 313,313 n.3 (1997) (listing English cases).
61. Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. (1 Pick.) 523, 526 (1837) (enforcing a covenant to sell
rights to a secret art of making chocolate); Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 458 (1868)
(holding the defendant liable for appropriating secret information in breach of a
contractual promise not to disclose it). One treatise writer points out that the Supreme
Court in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 493 n.23 (1974), incorrectly
identified Peabody as the first United States trade secrets case. 1 JAGER, supra note 60,
§ 2.02, at 2-7 n.21.1. Nevertheless, Peabody is viewed as the more thorough exposition of
the doctrine. Id. at 2.02.
62. WEBSTER'S DELUXE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1983); AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1971) ("Any method or device
that gives one an advantage over competitors."). The classic common law formulation
provides, "A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of
information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain
an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§ 757 cmt. b (1939).
63. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 (1995) ("The owner
of a trade secret does not have an exclusive right to possession or use of the secret
information."); CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW § 1.02, at 11 (4th ed. 1998)
(noting that the absence of a right of exclusive use makes trade secrets a weak form of
property protection).
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wrongfully used or taken.64 Thus, the interest in a trade secret is not
protected against the world, but only against malefactors.65 If
someone else independently discovers the secret information, the
original owner loses exclusive rights to the secret.66  Purposeful
scrutiny of an object is lawful, and although discovery in this way
extinguishes the initial holder's rights, such discovery is lawful.67
Discovery that occurs through an accident or luck is also not illegal. 68
"Ownership" of a trade secret, and the commercial advantage that
attends that ownership, is thus accurately characterized as inherently
precarious.69 The "leaky" nature of trade secrets means that secret
information often eventually enters the public domain, where others
are free to use it. Paradoxically, however, as long as secrecy is
maintained, this rather weak form of ownership may last forever.70
B. The Varying Law of Trade Secrets
States developed trade secret law through common law, resulting
in considerable variation among states.7' This variation is of two
sorts: the law of states may differ and, even when doctrines are
64. See Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 475-76 (noting that trade secret law does not
protect the holder when discovery is by fair and honest means, independent invention,
reverse engineering, or accidental disclosure); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 43 cmt. a (1995) (noting that protection is available only against wrongful
acquisition, use, or disclosure of the trade secret).
65. See Deutch, supra note 60, at 318-19,341 n.lll (noting that trade secret law does
not create an in rem property right that reaches third parties).
66. As long as the information is kept secret from others who would benefit from
knowing it, more than one owner may claim trade secret protection. See RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40
cmt. a (1995) (explaining that because neither novelty nor absolute secrecy is required
more than one discoverer can hold a proprietary interest in the same information).
67. See infra notes 304-08 and accompanying text (discussing reverse engineering).
68. See Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 476.
69. See id. at 490 (stating that trade secret law, unlike patent law, functions "as a
sieve" and noting also the risk of a secret passing to competitors in a manner that cannot
be detected or proved).
70. See id. at 494 (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting that trade secret law offers
"substantial protection" of unlimited duration and, in that sense, is "clearly superior" to
the limited monopoly term afforded by patent law).
The Coca-Cola formula provides the classic example of a trade secret that may
last forever. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 563 F. Supp. 1122, 1124-26 (D.
Del. 1985) (noting the impregnable barriers that the company has erected to protect its
valuable trade secret, the formula for Coca-Cola syrup).
71. See Marina Lao, Federalizing Trade Secrets Law in an Information Economy, 59
OHIO ST. L.J. 1633, 1649-65 (1998) (discussing variability of state trade secret law);
Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Case for a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 427, 442-45 (1995) (discussing variance in the treatment of trade secret
misappropriation).
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similar, the vague standards for ascertaining whether information is a
trade secret result in divergent decisions.72
The development of trade secret doctrine is characterized as
"uneven" and riven with "undue uncertainty." 73 Common law tends
to describe rather than define trade secrets, so no precise criteria exist
for determining whether information is a trade secret.74 Ironically,
despite the formulations of two Restatements and a Uniform Act,
there is still no uniform definition of a trade secret.75
A reading of these authorities indicates that since 1939, more
material has become eligible for protection under trade secret law.76
According to the Restatement of Torts, published in 1939,77
information that was eligible for trade secret status was limited to a
72. The variance is exacerbated by the continuing and uneven evolution of trade
secret law. See Gale R. Peterson, Trade Secrets in an Information Age, 32 HOUS. L. REv.
385, 387 (1995) (noting the significant changes in trade secret law as courts cope with new
issues).
73. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT prefatory note (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 434
(1990).
74. Treatise writers and commentators have noted the absence of a single definition.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. d (1995) (explaining
that trade secrets must be ascertained through a comparative evaluation of all relevant
factors); 1 JAGER, supra note 60, at 2-1 (noting that the "existence of a 'trade secret' in a
particular situation" is more a subjective legal conclusion than a finding of fact and
lamenting that there is no "readily discernible" definition of a trade secret); 1 ROGER M.
MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS, § 1.01, at 1-4 (2001) (warning practitioners to
research the definition of trade secrets in each jurisdiction because the term lacks a
uniform definition); Robert Unikel, Bridging the "Trade Secret" Gap: Protecting
"Confidential Information" Not Rising to the Level of Trade Secrets, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
841, 842 n.6 (1998) (noting that case law definitions often embody specific fact patterns
and cannot be extended to more universal fact situations).
75. Judges routinely note the absence of a definition. See, e.g., Lear Siegler, Inc. v.
Ark-Ell Springs, Inc., 569 F.2d 286, 288 (5th Cir. 1978) (stating that "[t]he term 'trade
secret' is one of the most elusive and difficult concepts in the law to define"); Cont'l Data
Sys., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 638 F. Supp. 432, 442 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (citing Anaconda Co. v.
Metric Tool & Die Co., 485 F. Supp. 410,421 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (noting that the resolution of
the issue regarding the existence of a trade secret is "more difficult" because there is no
precise definition)); Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assocs., Inc., 278 N.W.2d 81, 89
(Minn. 1979) (stating that the term "trade secret" has no universally recognized
definition); Ingersoll Rand Co. v. Ciavatta, 542 A.2d 879, 893 (NJ. 1988) ("There is no
exact definition of a trade secret."); Ashland Mgmt., Inc. v. Janien, 624 N.E.2d 1007, 1012
(N.Y. 1993) ("There is no generally accepted definition of a trade secret....").
76. That reading also reveals that development of a coherent doctrine has not been a
smooth undertaking. The decision not to include trade secrets in the Restatement (Second)
of Torts-because it was seen as a competitive tort-indicates the doctrinal disarray. See
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT prefatory note (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 434 (1990).
77. This influential work, the first to attempt to define a trade secret, outlined a civil
cause of action for damages and injunctive relief when trade secrets were taken by
wrongful means. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 757-759 (1939).
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narrow range of material that was "continuously used" in the
business.78
In light of the "unsatisfactory development" of trade secret law
and the failure to achieve uniformity,79 the American Law Institute
promulgated the Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("UTSA") in 1979.80
The UTSA expressly defined the general category of eligible material
as "information,"'" and explicitly included material not previously
thought to be trade secrets under the common law of most states,
such as programs, methods, techniques, and processes.' Notably, the
UTSA eliminated the requirement of continuous use in order to
protect incipient inventions,83 and added protection for information
with potential value.84 Most recently, in 1995, the Restatement (Third)
of Unfair Competition's definition of a trade secret included "any
information that can be used in the operation of a business," if it is
secret and has value.
85
78. That material consisted of a "formula, pattern, device, or compilation." See
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939) (stating also that a trade secret did not
include "other secret information in a business," such as the terms of a secret bid but did
include a client list).
79. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT prefatory note (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 434
(1990); Lao, supra note 71, at 1652 (noting that the First Restatement had failed to achieve
uniformity).
80. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr §§ 1-12 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1990).
The UTSA was issued in 1979 and amended in 1985. See Pace, supra note 71, at 432 n.17
(discussing the 1985 amendments, which added remedies available for trade secret
misappropriation).
81. The relevant provision states:
"Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation,
program, device, method, technique, or process, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by,
other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and
is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990).
82. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990)
(noting also that the terms include the concept of "know-how").
83. See id. The UTSA thus includes material that is in the development stage and
information that has only a negative value. Id.
84. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990);
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 & cmt. e (1995).
85. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995). The Third
Restatement is intended to be consistent with and to follow the UTSA. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. b (1995); Edmund W. Kitch,
The Expansion of Trade Secrecy Protection and the Mobility of Management Employees:
A New Problem for the Law, 47 S.C. L. REv. 659, 662 (1996) (stating that the Third
Restatement followed the Uniform Trade Secrets Act by eliminating the distinction
between information that is a trade secret and other confidential information). The Third
Restatement also eliminates the misappropriation cause of action that had applied to non-
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Despite these efforts to rationalize trade secret doctrine, a
consistent law of trade secrets has yet to materialize. First, the recent
changes in trade secret doctrine, embodied in the UTSA, have not
been adopted by every state. Although the UTSA has been
nominally adopted by forty-two states,86 those state laws often deviate
significantly from the UTSAY Second, courts that interpret statutes
purportedly based on the UTSA continue to invoke principles from
cases decided under the First Restatement of Torts.ss Third, nine
states, including Pennsylvania, New York, and Texas, have not
enacted civil trade secret laws and rely on the First Restatement and
the common law developed by their courts. 9 Moreover, states rely
upon different underlying theories to justify creating rights in trade
secretsf 0
In sum, no single, agreed-upon definition of a trade secret exists,
and considerable variation exists in other aspects of trade secret
doctrine. These characteristics, standing alone, make trade secrets an
secret business information. See Robert L. Tucker, Industrial Espionage as Unfair
Competition, 29 U. TOL. L. REV. 245, 266-69 (1998) (arguing that the Third Restatement
leaves nonsecret business information without protection). But see RAYMOND T.
NIMMER, INFORMATION LAWv § 3.17, at 3-77 (1996) (noting that the misappropriation
tort was not universally accepted).
Thus far, only a few courts have cited the Third Restatement. See, e.g., Religious
Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1252 (N.D.
Cal. 1995) (finding that the Church's techniques "used in the operation of the enterprise"
were deserving of protection if secret and valuable); Basic Am., Inc. v. Shatila, 992 P.2d
175,184 (Idaho 1999) (noting that the current Restatement definition is even broader than
that incorporated in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act).
86. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 statutory note, at
437-38 (1995) (listing states in which the UTSA or another civil trade secret statute of
general applicability is in effect).
87. See Lao, supra note 71, at 1657 (noting that the North Carolina and Alabama
statutes "deviate so radically from the UTSA that they are hardly recognizable as
adoptions of the uniform act"); Pace, supra note 71, at 443 (noting that several states have
adopted the 1979 version of UTSA); James Pooley, The Top Ten Issues in Trade Secret
Law, 70 TEMP. L. REv. 1181, 1188 (1997) (referring to UTSA as the "non-Uniform"
Trade Secrets Act because states have enacted it in "all sorts of different forms").
88. See Religious Tech. Ctr., 923 F. Supp. at 1250 n.21 (noting that although California
had adopted the UTSA, courts looked to the Restatement to interpret it); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETrION § 39 reporters' note, at 438 (1995); 1 JAGER, supra
note 60, § 3.01[1], at 3-5 (noting that courts use the Restatement of Torts for guidance
even when states have adopted the UTSA).
89. The other common law states are Michigan, Missouri, New Mexico, Tennessee,
Vermont, and Wyoming. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39
statutory note, at 437-38 (1995). These states, however, may have enacted a criminal
statute that prohibits thefts of trade secrets. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.05
(Vernon 1994).
90. See infra notes 171-243 and accompanying text (discussing underlying
justifications for trade secret law).
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unlikely candidate for protection through criminal law. Perhaps for
this reason, states generally use criminal law sparingly and prefer to
rely upon private civil suits in order to enforce trade secret law.91
C. A Civil Trade Secret Claim
A civil trade secret claimant must show that (1) the material at
issue is a trade secret, and (2) the defendant used improper means to
obtain the trade secret.' Whether information qualifies as a trade
secret depends on actual secrecy from competitors, the owner's
efforts to maintain secrecy, and commercial value that is based on the
secret nature of the information.93 In light of the inconsistent case law
and doctrine, the following discussion is couched in general terms.
1. Secrecy
As its name implies, secrecy is the defining characteristic and the
core value of trade secret doctrine. "The subject of a trade secret
must be secret and must not be of public knowledge in the trade or
business."'94 Secrecy, however, need not be absolute. 95 An absolute
standard of secrecy would limit or even prevent economically
efficient use of the information. Employees must be privy to secret
information necessary to perform their jobs, and potential buyers of a
business have an interest in ascertaining the value of the enterprise,
which may include its trade secrets.
In determining whether the information is secret, courts using
the First Restatement consider evidence of efforts made to keep the
information secret.96  The UTSA requires both secrecy and
91. See infra notes 115-25 and accompanying text (noting that state criminal laws
generally are more limited than their civil counterparts).
92. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 757-759 (1939); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1
(amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 434 (1990); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION §§ 39,43 (1995) (defining trade secret and improper means).
93. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 757-759 (1939); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AT § 1
(amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 434 (1990); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION §§ 39,43 (1995).
94. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475 (1974) (stating Ohio law,
which mirrored the First Restatement); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939)
(stating that an entity may not appropriate as its own secret matters of public knowledge
or of general knowledge in an industry).
95. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939) ("It is not requisite that only
the proprietor of the business know it."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 39 cmt. f (1995) (requiring only secrecy sufficient to confer an actual or
potential economic advantage on one who possesses the information).
96. The Restatement directs courts to consider several factors that deal with firms'
efforts: the extent of measures taken by the particular business to guard the secrecy of the
information; the amount of effort or money expended by the particular business in
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reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy. 97  These efforts include
advising employees of the existence of a trade secret, limiting access
to a trade secret on a "need to know basis," and controlling plant
access.9 Generally the efforts necessary to maintain secrecy need
only be reasonable under the circumstances. 9 Courts may consider
the defendant's conduct in determining whether the plaintiff's efforts
to maintain secrecy were reasonable.10 The test also takes into
account the value of the secret, requiring owners seeking to protect
trade secrets with a greater value to make greater efforts.01
2. Economic Value
Claimants also must establish that the secret information has
economic value and that this value emanates from its secrecy.) 2 As
the Restatement of Unfair Competition explains, information is
developing the information; and the ease or difficulty with which the information could be
properly acquired or duplicated by others. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b
(1939).
97. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990).
98. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACr § 1 commissioners' cmt. (amended 1985), 14
U.L.A. 438 (1990).
99. See Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 902 (Minn.
1983) (stating that the plaintiff's efforts were inadequate because of the non-intuitive
nature of the claimed secret, dimensions of a motor, as opposed to "secret formulas");
USM Corp. v. Marson Fastener Corp., 393 N.E.2d 895, 902 & n.12 (Mass. 1979) (stating
that an owner need not take "heroic measures");. But see J.T. Healy & Son, Inc. v. James
A. Murphy & Son, Inc., 260 N.E.2d 723, 731 (Mass. 1970) (recommending that a trade
secret owner keep "eternal vigilance").
100. See Dupont v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016-17 (5th Cir. 1970) (finding that
the holder of a trade secret could not reasonably protect against aerial reconnaissance);
DB Riley, Inc. v. AB Eng'g Corp., 977 F. Supp. 84, 90 (D. Mass. 1997) (stating that
Massachusetts courts balance security measures against a defendant's improper conduct).
101. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939) (recommending an evaluation
of the value of the information to the particular business and to its competitors). In
contrast to the First Restatement and the UTSA, the Third Restatement does not require
evidence of the owner's efforts to maintain secrecy, although such efforts are relevant. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. g (1995) (noting that if value
and secrecy are clear, evidence of specific precautions may be unnecessary).
102. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939) (stating that the information
must give its holder an advantage over competitors who do not know it); UNIF. TRADE
SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990) (providing that information
derives "independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known
to, and not being readily ascertainable by ... other persons who can obtain economic
value from its disclosure or use"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 39 cmt. e (1995) (stating that a trade secret must be of sufficient value in the operation of
an enterprise to provide actual or potential economic advantage over others who do not
possess the information). The UTSA broadens the concept of commercial value to
include negative information that proves a process will not work. See UNiF. TRADE
SECRETS ACT § 1 commissioners' cmt (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990).
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valuable when-and because-competitors do not have it. °3 The link
between secrecy and value reflects the logic that when competitors
possess the information, the person claiming a trade secret does not
enjoy a competitive advantage, so the secret cannot be economically
valuable. Thus, a process readily known to a particular industry, even
though not known by the general public, will not be considered a
trade secret.1' 4  Courts may conflate two separate inquiries, the




Finally, common law provides a remedy only when the secret was
subject to one of two types of conduct: (1) it was taken by "improper
means," or (2) the taking breaches a confidential relationship. 1°6 The
term "improper means" is defined ambiguously as those acts that fall
below generally accepted standards of commercial morality.1°7 Theft,
bribery, and misrepresentation are obviously improper.' Less
103. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. f (1995) (noting
that secrecy must be sufficient to confer an actual or potential economic advantage on its
possessor). Although the value need not be great, it must be more than trivial. See id.
104. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § 1 commissioners' cmt. (amended 1985), 14
U.L.A. 438 (1990) (noting that a trade secret may be lost even when the general public
does not know the secret).
105. See, e.g., Rockwell Graphic Sys. v. DEV Indus., 925 F.2d 174, 178-80 (7th Cir.
1991) (emphasizing that the requirement of reasonable efforts has both evidentiary and
remedial significance).
106. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475-76 (1974) (quoting
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757(a) (1939)). The Restatement provides:
One who discloses or uses another's trade secret, without privilege to do so, is
liable to the other if (a) he discovered the secret by improper means, or (b) his
disclosure or use constitutes a breach of confidence reposed in him by the other
in disclosing the secret to him ....
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 40-43 (1995) (imposing liability for misappropriation of a trade secret
when a person acquires the secret by theft, fraud, breach of confidence, or other wrongful
means); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr §§ 1(2), 3 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 438, 455
(1990) (providing a cause of action for the misappropriation of a trade secret when the
secret was acquired by improper means).
107. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. f (1939); see also DuPont v. Christopher,
431 F.2d 1012, 1016-17 (5th Cir. 1970) (holding that otherwise lawful aerial reconnaissance
was an improper means because holders of trade secrets could not reasonably protect
against intrusion of this sort).
108. See RESTATEMENT OFTORTS § 757 cmt. f (1939) (providing examples of theft and
wiretaps); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 (1995) (defining
"improper acquisition" to include theft, fraud, unauthorized interception of
communications, inducement of or knowing participation in a breach of confidence, and
other wrongful means); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § 1(1) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A.
437 (1990) (stating that "improper means" includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation,
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obvious is the formulation of the recently published Third
Restatement, that "improper means" includes "means wrongful in
themselves or wrongful under the circumstances of the case."'109
The second type of conduct, breach of a confidential
relationship, occurs when an actor uses or discloses the secret in
violation of an express or implied obligation.110  The UTSA
categorizes disclosure as a breach when the information was acquired
"under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy.""'
The Third Restatement explains that a duty to keep the information
secret arises when the actor expressly promised to do so, or,
somewhat less concretely, when the secret was disclosed under
circumstances that justify a conclusion that the information was
intended to be kept confidential."
In sum, the fact-intensive inquiry for civil claims depends on
several factors. Although courts successfully describe a trade secret,
the descriptive criteria do not provide a definition of a trade secret.
The determination becomes somewhat circular when courts rely on
the owner's efforts in maintaining secrecy to determine whether the
information is secret and therefore has economic value-and then use
economic value as an index of actual secrecy. State criminal laws use
these same standards, secrecy, economic value, and wrongful means,
but with significant limitations.
D. State Criminal Enforcement
Twenty-four states have enacted criminal statutes that
specifically prohibit theft or takings of trade secrets." This use of
criminal law as a means to protect trade secrets is relatively recent."4
More significantly, state criminal laws generally have a more limited
scope than their civil counterparts." 5  No clear consensus has
breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through
electronic or other means).
109. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 cmt. c (1995) (stating
that the acquisition of a trade secret may be improper even if the method used was not
independently wrongful).
110. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. j (1939) (noting the chief example of a
confidential relationship is that of principal and agent).
ill. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2)(ii)(B)(II) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 438
(1990).
112. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 41 (1995); see also id.
§ 42 (specifically applying section four to employees and former employees).
113. See 1 JAGER, supra note 60, at app. L_3 (providing criminal statutes).
114. See Lederman, supra note 21, at 930-31 (noting that most state criminal trade
secret statutes have been enacted since the 1960s).
115. See id at 943-66.
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emerged among the states regarding the circumstances under which
wrongful use or taking of information constitutes a criminal act.116
Consequently, the criminal statutes that prohibit stealing trade secrets
vary from state to state. n7
In 1989, Professor Eli Lederman classified state trade secret
crimes according to several factors.1 He concluded that the majority
of states either do not criminalize thefts of trade secrets or do so
restrictively," 9 a finding corroborated by other researchers. 120 For
example, Professor Lederman found that most state criminal statutes
only apply to trade secrets and information that are embodied in
some physical form. 121 The majority of state crimes do not apply to
takings accomplished by memorizing or other incorporeal transfers."
Finally, many states have not devoted significant resources to
prosecuting industrial espionage,' 23 and penalties for violating state
criminal laws regarding trade secrets are not stringent. 24
116. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text (presenting congressional findings
that state criminal laws are sporadic, inconsistent with one another, and largely
ineffective).
117. See Christopher A. Ruhl, Note, Corporate and Economic Espionage: A Model
Penal Approach for Legal Deterrence to Theft of Corporate Trade Secrets and Proprietary
Business Information, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 763, 801 (1999) (criticizing current state
criminal laws for their lack of uniformity).
118. See Lederman, supra note 21, at 943-66. The factors were (1) the "content" or
kind of information covered by the provision; (2) the "form" in which the information
existed, that is, whether physical or electronic; and (3) the "transfer" or whether the
information was taken by physical means. See id.
119. See id. at 966 (concluding that the conception of confidential information as
property was "still maturing").
120. See Pooley et al., supra note 30, at 189 (noting that state criminal laws are
frequently more limited in scope than their civil counterparts); Ruhl, supra note 117, at
798-801 (noting that current state criminal laws limit definitions of trade secret, fail to
proscribe sufficient modes of transmission or taking, and provide only low penalty
structures); Schwab & Porter, supra note 30, at 4 (stating that most state criminal trade
secret statutes apply only to scientific and technical information).
121. See Lederman, supra note 21, at 966 (noting that most states restrict criminal
responsibility to only corporeal acquisitions or transfers of information embodied in
tangible articles).
122. See id. (stating that the number of states using trade secret offenses to forbid
incorporeal retention or transfer of information "is still relatively modest").
123. See People v. Serrato, 62 Cal. App. 3d 9,24 (1976) (noting that the crime of trade
secret theft enacted in 1967 was "only rarely" enforced and suggesting that difficult,
complicated, and expensive investigation was the reason); Pooley et al., supra note 30, at
186.
124. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-8-10.4 (1994) (Class C felony); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-
36-107 (Michie 1997) (Class A misdemeanor); CAL. PENAL CODE § 499c (West 1999)
(misdemeanor); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-408 (1986) (Class 1 misdemeanor); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 812.081 (West 2000) (third-degree felony); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:73.2 (West
1997) (maximum of six months imprisonment); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.772 (West
1991) (misdemeanor); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3930 (West 2000) (third-degree felony);
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The tendency of states to insist that a physical manifestation of
the trade secret was taken, and other such limitations, may not be
entirely rational."2 Nevertheless, such limitations serve the purpose
of ensuring some degree of lenity in the face of a vague and elastic
doctrine. Given the indeterminate definition of a trade secret and the
circular determination of whether the information at issue is a trade
secret, narrow criminal provisions do not seem inappropriate.
III. FEDERAL TRADE SECRET LAW-THE EEA's BROADER
APPROACH
In enacting the EEA, Congress created a trade secret law that
differs from the common law by broadening both the kind of
information covered and the type of conduct prohibited. The EEA
thus expands and strengthens the rights of those who hold trade
secrets. The following discussion explains how the EEA applies to
more kinds of information, presents elements of the offense, and
notes potential problems of applying the statute.
A. The EEA Protects More Information As a Trade Secret
According to the EEA, any information is a trade secret if the
owner took reasonable measures to keep it secret and if it has
independent economic value because of its secrecy. 6 Congress's
formulation of a trade secret, unlike the common law's, expressly
TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.05(c) (Vernon 2001) (third-degree felony); WiS. STAT.
ANN. § 943.205(3) (West 1996) (Class E felony).
125. See Lederman, supra note 21, at 937 (noting that the practical significance of
including abstract information or procedure in the definition is lost when enforcement is
confined to corporeal acquisition and transmission); Arnold S. Weinrib, Information and
Property, 38 U. TORONTO L.J. 117, 140 (1988) (noting the oddity of conditioning criminal
liability on the use of physical paper).
126. The Act defines a trade secret as:
[A]ll forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or
engineering information, including patterns, plans, compilations, program
devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes,
procedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible or intangible, and whether or
how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically,
photographically, or in writing if -
(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such
information secret; and
(B) the information derives independent economic value, actual or
potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable through proper means by, the public.
18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2000).
The definition of a trade secret applies to both criminal provisions: economic
espionage when foreign entities are involved and theft of a trade secret by any actor. See
Id §§ 1831,1832,1839.
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includes "financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, [and]
engineering information."'27  The EEA provides an extensive-and
nonexhaustive-list of examples, ranging from the traditional
"formula" to cyber-age "programs" and "code. ''1"
Congress also went beyond state trade secret laws by expressly
including trade secrets that are stored in intangible systems.129 As a
result, the EEA may be read to protect trade secrets that exist only in
the mind of the holder13 against misappropriation through
memorization by another.131 In contrast, state criminal laws generally
use a narrower definition of trade secrets and do not cover takings by
memorization. 32
The EEA widens the category of trade secrets in another way,
which is both less obvious and more significant. States, whether they
follow the traditional Restatement, the UTSA, or even the new
Restatement, use knowledge by competitors as the touchstone by
which to determine the element of secrecy. 33  Congress, however,
used the general public as the reference point to determine whether
the information is secret." 4 The general public usually will not know,
nor be able to readily ascertain, information about a manufacturing
process or business procedure. Thus, it is easier for prosecutors in a
federal criminal case to establish that information is a trade secret
than it is for plaintiffs in state civil cases. 35 The standard used to
establish a trade secret under the EEA, a criminal statute, is less
127. Id- § 1839(3).
128. See id. (stating that a trade secret includes "patterns, plans, compilations, program
devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures,
programs, or codes").
129. See id. (stating that trade secrets include information "whether tangible or
intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically").
130. Id.
131. See id. § 1832(a)(2) (prohibiting the unauthorized delivery, communication, and
conveyance of information).
132. See supra notes 118-24 and accompanying text (summarizing Lederman's study
that found that most state criminal laws require physical manifestation of a secret).
133. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. f (1995); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended
1985), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990).
134. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B) (providing that guarded information must be valuable
because it is not "generally known to" or not "readily ascertainable" by the general
public).
135. See United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 196 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting the provision
broadens the EEA's scope by altering the relevant party from whom proprietary
information must be kept); Pooley et al., supra note 30, at 191 (characterizing this
provision as a "dramatic[] lower[ing]" of the civil standard).
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rigorous than state civil law standards-or most state criminal laws.136
As a result, a person could be guilty of a federal offense for conduct
that would not violate state civil law. In sum, the EEA protects a
wider variety of information than current civil laws, both directly and
indirectly.
Although federal courts could constrain the EEA's breadth by
insisting upon rigorous proof that the information is a trade secret,
that prospect seems unlikely. Under the EEA, the holder must take
reasonable measures to keep the information secret. 37 The House
Report on the EEA indicates that Congress felt it sufficient if courts
utilized the civil standard, that owners must take only objectively
reasonable measures to protect the information.'38
In the same vein, the requirement of secrecy would appear to
require proof that the information was actually secret. 39  As noted
earlier, however, civil courts may infer that the information is, in fact,
secret whenever the owner made reasonable efforts to maintain that
secrecy and when it is economically valuable. 40  These tests for
secrecy have allowed courts to hold that information is secret even
when the holder of the secret encouraged its dissemination.'
The EEA also states that information is not secret unless it has
independent economic value, either actual or potential, because it is
136. See supra notes 118-24 and accompanying text (noting that state criminal trade
secret laws are generally more narrowly drawn than state civil law).
137. See § 1839(3)(A).
138. See H.R. REP. No. 104-788, at 7 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021,4026.
139. See Metallurgical Indus. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1199 (5th Cir. 1986)
(interpreting Texas law) ("[T]o qualify as [a trade secret], the subject matter involved
must, in fact, be a secret .... "); Basic Am., Inc. v. Shatila, 992 P.2d 175, 183 (Idaho 1999)
(stating that "in order to prevail ... plaintiff must show that a trade secret actually
existed").
The First Restatement states: "The subject matter of a trade secret must be
secret." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b. (1939).
140. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984) (noting that a
property right in a trade secret is defined by the extent to which the owner protects his
interest from disclosure to others); Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., 925 F.2d
174, 179 (7th Cir. 1991) (explaining that an owner's efforts to keep information secret are
evidence of the value of the secret); supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text (discussing
the standard of secrecy).
In a disquieting development, some state laws direct courts to presume secrecy if
the holder had taken reasonable measures to protect the information. See, e.g., 415 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 513.48 (West 1997).
141. See Schalk v. Texas, 823 S.W.2d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (noting that the
defendants argued "somewhat convincingly" that the information was not a secret because
the company encouraged sharing research with other scientists in the same field by
delivering academic papers on the subject).
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not known to the general public.42 Congress neglected, however, to
explain how the factfinder is to determine whether the information
has actual or potential "independent economic value." This gap is
significant because there is no single agreed-upon method of
ascertaining the value of trade secrets,143 and because a showing of
minimal value may satisfy the standard. 44  The inclusion of
information with only potential or negative value also raises
significant measurement problems because of the difficulty of
establishing a market value in such circumstances.
In addition to these concerns, the broad and open-ended
attributes of trade secrets raise significant issues in the criminal
context. For instance, the district court in United States v. Hsu,45 a
case that has resulted in important interpretations of the EEA,
expressed significant reservations about the statute's "vaporous
terms.'1 46  A definitive analysis of whether the EEA is
unconstitutionally vague deserves further judicial development and
more attention than can be given here. Nevertheless, the concerns of
the district court in Hsu merit brief mention. The court took issue
with the statutory terms used to determine secrecy, the language
requiring the owner to take "reasonable measures" and the language
"generally known to or readily ascertainable by the public."147
Although the court rejected the vagueness challenge, 48 it expressed
142. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B).
143. See Alexander & Wood, supra note 30, at 918-19 (noting that judges have used
various measures to establish value); supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text
(discussing requirement of economic value); infra note 334 (discussing problem of
ascertaining value of a trade secret).
144. This would appear to be the outcome if the courts rely upon the civil standard,
which is both low and vague ("greater than trivial"). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995).
145. 40 F. Supp. 2d 623 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
146. See id. at 630. Hsu argued that several phrases in the definition section of the
statute were unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 625. One challenge was to the language that
an owner take "reasonable measures" to establish secrecy. See id. at 628. Hsu also
challenged the definition of a trade secret that requires "the information to derive
independent economic value.., from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable through proper means by, the public." Id. at 626.
147. See id. at 630 (registering concern because analysis of the EEA definition is "more
problematic" than that required when terms are clearly defined).
148. The challenges failed for reasons specific to the facts of the case. First, the court
found that Hsu knew that the firm had taken many steps to keep its technology secret
because an FBI agent had told him that it had. Id. at 628. Second, the charges in this case,
attempt and conspiracy, did not require the government to establish that trade secrets
existed, but only that the defendant thought the information was a trade secret. Id. at 629;
see also United States v. Krumrei, 258 F.3d 535, 539 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that the EEA
was not vague as applied because the defendant admitted as part of plea bargain that he
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significant concerns over the absence of a fixed definition of a trade
secret.49 According to the court, in contrast to other offenses, a
significant element of this offense depends, not upon a clearly defined
end, but upon what is "generally known" or "readily ascertainable"
by some unclear conception of the public.150 The court noted that
information that is "generally known" or "reasonably ascertainable"
at any given moment is never necessarily certain because ideas,
concepts, and technology are constantly evolving.15 ' The court finally
noted, with considerable frustration, that Congress had not defined
"the public," and wondered whether Congress meant the general, the
scientific, the commercial, or even the judicial public.
1 52
Congress's failure to be more specific is particularly problematic
in a criminal statute. A description rather than a definition of a trade
secret and a manipulable test to determine the issue may be
acceptable in a civil suit when the penalty is money damages. 3 The
question of whether the material is a trade secret can be determined
at trial.154 But in a criminal action, whether information is protected
should be clear to citizens before trial. A descriptive
conceptualization, rather than a definition, may not provide
constitutional notice in the criminal context. 55 If citizens cannot
determine whether material is a trade secret, arguably they do not
have notice that using the material may be a criminal offense. 56 Clear
notice also furthers a goal of criminal law-to reduce violations. In
addition to failing to provide adequate notice, the statute may also
fail to satisfy the enforcement prong of the vagueness test because the
knew information was "proprietary" and stated that he "should have known" the
information was a trade secret).
149. See Hsu, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 629.
150. See id. at 630.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See COLEMAN, supra note 59, at 28 (stating that the absence of a generally
accepted definition "does not matter too much" because an appreciation of the "overall
concept" is most important and praising the flexibility of law); Id. at 4 (stating that to
"appreciate the concept" is a better approach than formulating a definition).
154. See Peterson, supra note 72, at 387-88 (noting that the first task is to establish
whether information is a trade secret).
155. See United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) (stating that no one "shall be
held criminally responsible for conduct which [that person] could not reasonably
understand to be proscribed"); Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)
(stating that a criminal statute violates due process when the average person "must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application").
156. See Connally, 269 U.S. at 391; United States v. Protex Indus., Inc., 874 F.2d 740,
743 (10th Cir. 1989) (noting that the essence of the vagueness doctrine is that potential
defendants must have "fair warning") (citations omitted).
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descriptive language does not provide adequate guidance to
prosecutors. 57
In sum, the EEA's expansion of the subject matter that qualifies
as a trade secret creates a qualitatively different kind of trade secret
law. The federal law broadens the kinds of information that may be
deemed a trade secret, expanding the rights of those with secret
information. In addition, Congress used vague terms that fail to
provide notice to citizens and guidelines to prosecutors. Moreover,
the elements of the crime, especially those relating to conduct, depart
from common law and present significant issues.
B. The Conduct and Culpability Elements of Economic Espionage
Once a trade secret is established, the EEA makes it a criminal
offense for anyone to engage in certain conduct with the requisite
criminal intent. The statute prohibits acts that range from actually
taking some physical embodiment of the secret information, for
instance a paper on which the secret is written, to almost any
unauthorized interference with the information. 58  Prohibited
conduct includes a broader range of improper means than those
prohibited by state civil or criminal laws. In addition, the Act
includes the inchoate offenses of attempt and conspiracy to
misappropriate information.5
Recall that the common law provides a cause of action only when
the parties were in a confidential relationship or when defendants
used "improper means."'" In contrast, the EEA's version of
improper means encompasses almost any unauthorized use of a trade
157. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974) (stating that when the legislature
fails to provide minimal guidelines it may permit "policemen, prosecutors, and juries to
pursue their personal predilections"); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156,
168 (1972) (stating that vague statutes violate due process by placing unfettered discretion
in the hands of police, thereby permitting or even encouraging arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement).
158. The provision states:
(a) Whoever, with intent to convert a trade secret, that is related to or included
in a product that is produced for or placed in interstate or foreign commerce, to
the economic benefit of anyone other than the owner thereof, and intending or
knowing that the offense will, injure any owner of that trade secret, knowingly
(1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries away, or conceals,
or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtains such information;
(2) without authorization copies, duplicates, sketches, draws, photographs,
downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies, replicates, transmits, delivers,
sends, mails, communicates, or conveys such information
18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(1)-(2) (2000).
159. See id. § 1832(a)(4)-(5).
160. See supra notes 92-112 and accompanying text (discussing a civil cause of action).
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secret: unauthorized copying, duplicating, drawing, photographing,
downloading, uploading, and other uses of the information become
criminal acts when the culpability elements are met.'61 The "improper
means" that merits criminal penalties has become unauthorized use-
freed from the requirement of a confidential relationship. Not only
does the EEA protect more information, prohibiting any
unauthorized use also strengthens holders' rights in that
information. 62
In contrast to the straightforward, albeit broadening, conduct
provisions, the Act's culpability elements are facially more complex.
The government must first prove that actors "knowingly" interfered
with a trade secret or "knowingly" used it in an unauthorized
manner.163 Prosecutors thus must establish that defendants knew the
information was a trade secret.'6 Second, the government must
prove that defendants acted with the intent to convert a trade secret
to the economic benefit of themselves or another person. 65 Finally,
the government must prove that actors intended or at least knew that
the conduct would injure the owner. 66
Because the EEA criminalizes acts that are not always
recognized as inherently unlawful, criminal intent is a crucial element
of the offense, and the multiple culpability elements of the offense
161. See § 1832(a)(2).
162. For example, the conduct provisions appear to criminalize acts necessary to
reverse engineer a product, providing another significant expansion of holders' rights. See
infra notes 304-08 and accompanying text (discussing the reverse engineering problem).
163. See § 1832(a) (1)-(2).
164. See 142 CONG. REC. S12,213 (1996) (stating that a "person must be aware or
substantially certain that he is misappropriating a trade secret").
But consider that the Third Circuit has held that when the charge is attempted
trade secret misappropriation, the prosecutor need not prove that the information was, in
fact, a trade secret because the crucial inquiry is whether the defendant thought it was a
trade secret. See United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 202-03 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that the
defendant had such a belief because a federal agent acting as a seller in the sting operation
had told the defendant that the information was a trade secret).
165. See 142 CONG. REC. 512,213; cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETTON § 40 cmt. c (1995) (explaining that a former employee who discloses a trade
secret of a former employer in retaliation is subject to liability under section 40 on grounds
that the purpose of disclosure was to harm the owner). Commentators have been quick to
point out that the requirement of intent to gain an economic benefit probably excludes
acts by computer hackers and disgruntled employees. See, e.g., Pooley et al., supra note
30, at 198.
166. See 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a). This language does not specifically require that the
victim suffer an economic injury, but consistency with the entire provision argues for that
interpretation. But see H.R. REP. NO. 104-788, at 11-12 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021, 4030 (stating that this provision requires the government to prove the
actor knew that the conduct would cause some disadvantage to the rightful owner)
(emphasis added).
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may limit enforcement. 167 For instance, it may be difficult for the
government to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant
knew information was a trade secret if evidence sheds doubt as to
whether a trade secret existed.16  Further analysis of the culpability
elements await judicial application and interpretation as those
decisions are likely to affect greatly the scope of the Act and
enforcement efforts.169
In sum, the EEA criminalizes conduct that would not give rise to
a civil cause of action and that is broader than state criminal statutes.
The EEA expands the range of protected material by adopting an
expansive conception of trade secrets that raises constitutional
vagueness and notice issues. The broad definition of a trade secret
means that the EEA protects more property than state laws, and its
broad conduct provision creates stronger rights in that property by
prohibiting any unauthorized use of secret information. Most
basically, the Act gives holders of secret information a powerful new
tool with which to guard their interests.
The decision to create a new federal law of trade secrets through
a criminal provision and the breadth of that enactment prompts two
inquiries: (1) what is the conceptual basis for the law, and (2) what
are the consequences of using a criminal provision. The following
section turns first to common law in order to identify and evaluate the
conceptual basis of trade secret law. The inquiry then examines the
basis used by Congress in enacting the Economic Espionage Act. In
Part V, the analysis examines the potential consequences of using
criminal law to regulate use of trade secrets.
167. Hsu, 155 F.3d at 195-96 (noting that the general provision includes limitations
based on the criminal state of mind).
168. United States v. Hsu, 185 F.R.D. 192, passim (E.D. Pa. 1999) (noting that four
experts had differed as to whether material was a trade secret and questioning whether an
ordinary person could determine the point when specialists in the field could not).
169. Those decisions are likely to be challenging because culpability elements create
interpretative problems for courts. See Richard Singer & Douglas Husak, Of Innocence
and Innocents: The Supreme Court and Mens Rea Since Herbert Packer, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 859, 889-90 (1999) (illustrating the complexity of interpreting culpability elements of
18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2000) (prohibiting knowingly transporting and shipping pornographic
material)); John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Not Guilty by Reason of Blamelessness: Culpability in
Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1021, 1113 (1999) (illustrating
permutations that result when it is not clear to which elements of the offense express
culpability language applies).
170. See infra notes 262-318 and accompanying text.
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IV. THE CONTRASTING CONCEPTUAL BASES OF TRADE SECRET
LAW AND OF THE EEA
An inquiry into the reasons for protecting interests in trade
secrets must recognize that there is no single reason for protecting
trade secrets.171 Common law jurists relied upon two main
justifications, referred to here as property and conduct.172 Under the
property justification, trade secrets constitute a form of property
subject to legal protection. The second and more widely accepted
justification, conduct, focuses on a desire to maintain standards of
commercial behavior.73
The common law justifications generally have short-term goals
that operate as ends in themselves, such as deterring undesirable
behavior, but they also may implicate longer-term goals and broader
171. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. a (1995) (noting
that protecting trade secrets "advances several interests"); see Richard H. Stem, A
Reexamination of Preemption of State Trade Secret Law After Kewanee, 42 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 927, 938 (1974) (concluding that the law of trade secrets is not a single, well-
defined body of doctrines).
Some scholars conclude that there is no adequate justification for a separate trade
secret law. See Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of
Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241, 245 (1998) (concluding that trade secret law does not
rest on an independent ground and is parasitic); Vincent Chiappetta, Myth, Chameleon or
Intellectual Property Olympian? A Normative Framework Supporting Trade Secret Law, 8
GEO. MASON L. REV. 69, 73-116 (1999) (agreeing with Bone, but constructing an
alternate policy justification based on concepts of leveraging, public order, and
commercial privacy); Deutch, supra note 60, at 320-21 (analyzing the property concept of
trade secrets); David D. Friedman et al., Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. ECON.
PERSP. 61, 62 (1991) (recognizing that most trade secret violations are tied to other
wrongs).
Others are more sanguine. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of
Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LEGAL STuD. 683, 708-23 (1980) (applying economic
analysis to justify laws that protect information); Weinrib, supra note 125, at 126-27
(arguing that the reality of modem commerce is a sufficient reason for legal protection of
confidential business information).
172. These categories are analogous to entitlements based on property and tort. See
generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (offering a
framework of legal analysis that integrates legal relationships in property and tort law).
173. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,481-82 (1974) (referring to the
policy of maintaining standards of commercial ethics).
In Kewanee Oil Co., the Court also suggested that trade secret law is grounded on
privacy interests. Id. at 487 (mentioning that trade secret law protects an owner's
"fundamental human right, that of privacy"). But see Bone, supra note 171, at 284-89
(rejecting privacy rationale for corporations); Tucker, supra note 85, at 249 (rejecting the
right of privacy for corporations). Others favor the law of contract. See Kewanee Oil Co.,
416 U.S. at 498 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating that a suit to redress theft of a trade secret
is grounded in tort damages for breach of contract); Bone, supra note 171, at 297
(concluding that contract theories provide the only rational explanation for trade secret
law).
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public interests. Thus, deterring disapproved conduct is also a way to
regulate competition and to ensure its fairness. Alternatively, we
protect trade secrets as property-not only because property merits
protection, but also in order to encourage the creation of innovative
and creative products. 7 4 These longer-term justifications are often
offered as a post-hoc explanation, an effort to defend or to rationalize
the common law. Although such after-the-fact reasoning almost
certainly does not reflect the thinking of common law jurists, it may
reveal other valid reasons for trade secret law. Therefore, the
following analysis presents both the immediate reasons that inspired
common law jurists to protect the interests of trade secret holders and
the broader, longer-term policy goals that this legal doctrine may
achieve.
As a preface, it ought to be acknowledged that the difference
between the property and conduct rationales, especially in
enforcement, may not be definitive.175 Nevertheless, treating the
justifications separately helps to ascertain the purpose, rationale, and
scope of the Economic Espionage Act. Identifying the purpose for
enacting new legislation is an indispensable first step in evaluating the
legislation's efficacy, as well as in guiding courts in interpreting the
statute.
A. The Conduct Basis of Trade Secret Law
The most commonly used justification for protecting trade
secrets and the interests of trade secret holders rests on the conduct
of the person who interferes with secret information. The vast
majority of states rely upon a conduct justification for protecting
trade secrets.
176
1. The Traditional View of Conduct-Commercial Morality
Under the traditional common law view, trade secret law is based
on a desire to enforce certain standards of commercial conduct.
177
174. See Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 481-82 (referring to encouragement of
invention).
175. See 1 JAGER, supra note 60, § 4.01[3], at 4-24 (characterizing the distinctions as
"often academic and practically meaningless"); Pooley et al., supra note 30, at 193-94 n.99
(noting tort and property theory may "push in the same direction").
176. See 1 JAGER, supra note 60, § 4.01[2], at 4-8 (reporting that the majority of state
court decisions follow conduct theory); 1 MILGRIM, supra note 74, at § 5.02(1) n.7.
177. As noted, trade secret law addresses two types of conduct and the rationale for
deterring each type is similar. The first is based on a duty, either express or implied, to
keep a confidence; it is often referred to as breach of confidentiality. The second type of
conduct, "wrongful means," includes such acts as bribing competitors' employees,
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When conduct fails to meet the prevailing commercial standards,
wrongdoers are forced to return any financial benefit that they gained
through bad behavior. This deterrent mechanism discourages
undesirable conduct that fails to meet the standards. Two cases,
although widely separated in time, illustrate the rationale and
uncertain boundary of the conduct justification.
In E.L DuPont De Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland,178 Justice
Holmes explained the conduct rationale of trade secret doctrine,
emphasized the wrong of breaching confidentiality, and distinguished
the property and conduct views of trade secret law in a short, but
widely quoted, opinion. The unanimous Court refused to entertain
the argument that a secret process for making artificial leather was
property.179 Justice Holmes found no merit in the property argument,
holding that property "is an unanalyzed expression of certain
secondary consequences of the primary fact that the law makes some
rudimentary requirements of good faith."'80 Instead, the Court based
liability on conduct. Noting that the defendant only knew about the
process through a special confidence, the Court stated that he should
not be allowed to abuse that trust. 8 ' As Justice Holmes succinctly
stated, "The property may be denied, but the confidence cannot
be."1'2 In short, the law will not condone wrongful conduct-in this
case breaching a confidence-by allowing the wrongdoer to profit.
A well-known, and more recent case, DuPont v. Christopher,8'
explains the policy associated with the conduct model. The
Christopher brothers were hired, presumably by a competitor of the
plaintiff, to photograph a partially completed factory from the air.'84
The Fifth Circuit held that this otherwise lawful reconnaissance was
improper because the photographs revealed information about the
manufacturing process that the plaintiff had taken reasonable
measures to keep secret.18 In explaining its rationale, the court
emphasized the policy of establishing standards of commercial
trespassing, or stealing. See supra notes 106-12 and accompanying text (discussing the
conduct element of a trade secret civil suit).
178. 244 U.S. 100 (1917).
179. See id. at 102 (interpreting Pennsylvania law).
180. Id.
181. See id. (adding that the defendant had accepted that confidence).
182. Id.
183. 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970).
184. See id. at 1012-14 (noting the defendants' arguments that they did not fly directly
overhead or otherwise trespass, complied with air regulations, and did not engage in
fraudulent or illegal conduct).
185. See id. at 1016 (stating it would not be reasonable to require the plaintiff to
construct a roof over an unfinished plant).
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morality. Its decision was consistent, thought the court, with a trend
to encourage high standards of behavior in the business world.186
Improper conduct could not be sanctioned: "[T]he market place must
not deviate far from our mores."'" The court also noted: "[O]ur
devotion to free wheeling industrial competition must not force us
into accepting the law of the jungle as the standard of morality
expected in our commercial relations."'m
Although the decision is considered an outlier in its sanctioning
of otherwise legal conduct, 89 the maintenance of standards of
commercial morality is an accepted justification for protecting the
interests of trade secret holders. Supreme Court decisions continue
to rely on the conduct justification.19° State courts,191 scholars,'9 and
treatise writers 93 also repeatedly have endorsed the objective of
maintaining commercial standards.
2. The Modem Rendition of the Conduct Justification-Competition
and Efficiency
A modern approach builds upon the insight that deterring
certain conduct is one way of regulating competition among
businesses. Indeed, the most recent formulation of common law
regards taking of trade secrets as a type of unfair competition.194 This
186. See id. (finding that the Texas Supreme Court had declared that "the undoubted
tendency of the law has been to recognize and enforce higher standards of commercial
morality in the business world") (citations omitted).
187. Id. at 1017.
188. Id. at 1016.
189. See Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 178-79 (7th Cir.
1991) (suggesting that Christopher represents a property view of trade secret law because
it established rights against the world, not merely against those who act unlawfully).
190. In two relatively recent criminal decisions involving fraud of confidential business
information, the Court relied upon breaches of a duty of confidentiality to find deception
required by fraud. In Carpenter v. United States, the Court invoked common law precepts
relating to employees' fiduciary duties in condemning the violation of that duty. 484 U.S.
19, 27 (1987). In United States v. O'Hagan, involving securities fraud, the Court
emphasized the duty of a fiduciary not to use a principal's information for personal gain.
521 U.S. 642,653 (1997).
191. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 reporters' note, cmt.
b, 440 (1995) (listing cases).
192. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Ac'r § 1 commissioners' cmt. (amended 1985), 14
U.L.A. 438 (1990) ("One of the broadly stated policies behind trade secret law is 'the
maintenance of standards of commercial ethics.' ").
193. See 1 JAGER, supra note 60, § 1.03, at 1-8 n.22 (noting that concern for business
morality is a constant theme of the common law of trade secrets and listing cases).
194. See Brunswick Corp. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 404 N.E.2d 205, 207 (IM. 1980)
(stating that the third doctrinal base of trade secret protection is the public interest in free
competition in goods unprotected by patents); supra note 76 (explaining that the trade
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newer view looks behind the desire to ensure some acceptable
standard of business conduct to identify a broader social goal:
maintaining a high standard of commercial morality is a means to
ensure fair competition.
The unfair competition view of trade secret law is not an entirely
new approach to the issue of protecting information products. In the
International News Service v. Associated Press95 case of 1918, the
Supreme Court considered the conduct of competing news
organizations and enforced an injunction against International News
Service ("INS"); INS had rewritten and published its competitor's
stories in its own newspapers. 196 The Court considered whether news
was property, but based the decision on a broad theory of unfair
competition. Even Justice Holmes, who disagreed with much of the
majority's reasoning, agreed that a narrower ground of unfair
competition justified the majority's result.19
In 1974, the Supreme Court again spoke on the connection
between trade secret law and the competitive process. 99 In Kewanee
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., ° the Court considered whether federal
patent law pre-empted state trade secret laws. In ruling against
preemption, the Court reasoned that trade secret law encourages
businesses to initiate new plans of operation and results in
"constructive" competition.201 Trade secret law fosters efficiency. By
preventing wasteful measures, holders of trade secrets need not incur
the costs of excessive efforts to ensure secrecy.2 In a similar vein,
the Court thought that trade secret law encouraged efficient
secret tort was moved from the general Restatement of Torts to the Third Restatement of
Competition).
195. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
196. See id. at 246.
197. See id. at 239-40 (noting the unfairness of appropriating to oneself the result of a
competitor's work).
198. See id. at 246-48 (Holmes, J., concurring) (noting that the International News
Service engaged in unfair competition by not properly crediting its competitor as the
source of the stories).
199. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 485 (1974) (stating that trade
secret law fosters competition by encouraging invention in areas patent law does not
reach).
200. 416 U.S. at 470.
201. Id. at 483.
202. See id. at 485-87 (noting that trade secret laws reduce defensive measures such as
duplicative manufacturing and marketing practices that firms would take in order to
protect secrecy).
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production methods. 3 According to the Court, trade secrets benefit
the general public by allowing the public to buy the invention or some
product, the manufacture of which depended upon a trade secret.2°4
This line of reasoning ignores a countervailing issue-that, in the
long run, protecting interests against competitors often allows the
protected party to charge a higher price for the product. When
viewed from this perspective, the law of trade secrets may be seen to
inhibit competition and economic efficiency by creating a monopoly
producer. °5 Creating a monopoly is not usually considered a
constructive way to support competition; monopolists restrain trade
203. See id. at 482 (stating that trade secret law increases economic efficiency within
large companies by enabling the "dispersion of responsibilities for creative
developments").
204. See id. at 485 (noting that the public is not deprived of the use of valuable
invention because the trade secret holder can license the use of the invention to others and
be legally protected). This view ignores the possibility of a reduced or nonexistent
demand for information because it is, in fact, unknown to others or because it may not be
in the holder's interest to make it available, even under license. See, e.g., Robert C. Dean,
Jr., Patent Law's Impact on Invention and Innovation, 4 TEx. REv. L. & POL. 95,99 (1999)
(noting that RCA, sponsor of research on FM radio, blocked implementation of FM
because it would destroy RCA's interests in AM radio).
205. See Brunswick Corp. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 404 N.E.2d 205, 207 (Ill. 1980)
(noting the public interest in the sale and manufacture of goods not protected by a valid
patent). In contrast to that view, some argue that intellectual property rights are simply
property rights and do not implicate monopoly concerns. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook,
Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 108, 109 (1990);
Edmund W. Kitch, Patents: Monopolies or Property Rights?, 8 RES. L. & ECON. 31,33-34
(1986).
Nevertheless, antitrust law has been deployed against patent holders in some
circumstances. See SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1210 (2d Cir. 1981) (stating
that section 7 of the Clayton Act proscribes a corporation from acquiring the assets-
which include patents-of another corporation when "the effect may be to substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly" (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976)), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982); see also Willard K. Tom & Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust and
Intellectual Property: From Separate Spheres to a Unified Field, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 167,
170 n.20 (1997) (stating that "ownership of intellectual property confers upon the
intellectual property holder a 'monopoly' ").
Further, if other elements necessary to prove a monopolization case are present,
enforcement of a patent that was procured through knowing and willful misrepresentation
may be deemed a violation of the Sherman Act. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food
Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174 (1965); Cataphote Corp. v. DeSoto Chem.
Coatings, Inc., 450 F.2d 769,770 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 929 (1972).
The Justice Department is currently investigating whether the major recording
companies are violating antitrust laws by using their copyrights in an anticompetitive
manner. See Matt Richtel, U.S. Inquiry is Under Way on Online Music Business, N.Y.
TIMFS, Oct. 16, 2001, at C2 (reporting the investigation of joint ventures between
copyright holders to distribute online music).
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when they keep others out of the market and charge higher than
necessary prices for their products.2 6
A concept of competition that encourages vigorous competition
and is also fair to competitors is difficult to implement. The law tries
to balance the need to protect business assets from certain
interferences with the need to promote competition between
businesses. The freedom to compete for business is a fundamental
premise of the free enterprise system; competition creates incentives
to offer quality products at reasonable prices and fosters the general
welfare by promoting efficient allocation of resources,
Notwithstanding the benefits of competition to the public, all
businesses do not benefit from competition; competitors necessarily
harm one another. The law of unfair competition thus imposes
liability for competitive harms only when the particular method of
competition is determined to be unfair.2 s The concept of unfair
competition echoes a theme that permeates misappropriation cases,
the unfairness that results when someone who has not expended time
or money profits from another person's effort? 9
Whether its basis is to redress a breach of confidentiality, to
encourage fair competition, or to rectify unfairness, the conduct
model continues to influence judicial and legislative decisions.
Nevertheless, the conduct rationale does not entirely stand apart from
the property justification. Condemning conduct that occurs in
relation to some interest inevitably casts that interest as property-or
as the Supreme Court famously stated-a "quasi-property right."21
206. See ROGER SHERMAN, REGULATION OF MONOPOLY 62-67 (1989).
207. See generally id. at 54-58 (explaining the benefits of competition).
208. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 cmt. a (1995).
209. See Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S 215, 239 (1918) (stating that the
defendant newspaper was "endeavoring to reap where it has not sown," thus
appropriating the "harvest of those who have"); see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,
416 U.S. 470, 482 (1974) (stating that a discovery that is not patentable should not
advantage "one who obtains the desired knowledge without himself paying the price in
labor, money, or machines" (quoting A.O. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73
F.2d 531, 539 (1934))). The Fifth Circuit also drew upon the unfairness theme when it
characterized aerial photography as unfair because it allowed the defendant "to avoid
labor." See E.I. DuPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1015 (5th Cir.
1970) ("To obtain knowledge of a process without spending the time and money to
discover it independently is improper.").
A persuasive argument has been made that the impulse to redress unjust
enrichment underlies misappropriation doctrine. See Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning
Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 156
(1992) (noting that the trend to use misappropriation to grant rights in intellectual
property is based on an intuitive sense of fairness).
210. Intl News Serv., 248 U.S. at 236.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
The justifications based on property and conduct are not absolutely
distinct, either in general,21' or in trade secret law.2 12 In addition, both
justifications may serve a similar policy goal.213
B. The Property Justification of Trade Secret Law
Only four states justify trade secret law by treating trade secrets
as a form of property. 14 Under the broad form of this view, trade
secrets are reflexively deemed to be property, and therefore the law
protects the interests of those who hold such secrets. A narrower,
more sophisticated property justification analogizes trade secrets to
intellectual property, and rests on the same utilitarian foundation.
1. The Traditional View
Under the traditional property model, owners' interests in trade
secrets are protected for the same reasons that tangible property is
protected.1 5 Property rights flow from a natural right that goes to the
first person to discover or to occupy some object, or to those who use
their labor, be it physical or intellectual, to create an object, whether
tangible or intangible.216
211. See Moohr, supra note 20, at 722-24 (discussing the relation between the property
and conduct categories of criminal law).
212. See J. Neel Chatterjee, Should Trade Secret Appropriation Be Criminalized?, 19
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 853, 874 (1997) (arguing that trade secret doctrine is a
hybrid that fits under both property and liability regimes); Peterson, supra note 72, at 457
(explaining that trade secret protection is based on a "marriage" of property and wrongful
appropriation).
213. This is particularly true when the goal is articulated in broad or abstract terms.
See Rockwell Graphic Sys. v. DEV Indus., 925 F.2d 174, 178 (7th Cir. 1991) (explaining
that one trade secret theory deters efforts whose "sole purpose and effect is the
redistribution of wealth from one firm to another" and that the second theory prevents
"sterile wealth-distributive" activities).
214. See 1 JAGER, supra note 60, § 4.01[3], at 9-15 (reporting that only a few states
adhere to a property view of trade secret law).
215. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. b (1995) (stating
that early trade secret theory treated trade secrets as property).
216. See JOHN LOCKE, Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES ON
GOVERNMENT 396 (Oskar Piest ed. 1947) (stating that "whenever one mingles his effort
with the raw stuff of the world, any resulting product ought-simply ought-to be his");
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations
of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1204-05 (1967) (explaining the
theory that suggests ownership follows labor).
Recent scholarship has identified another justification for the general trend to
strengthen rights in intellectual property-our romantic view of authorship. See, e.g.,
JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, & SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF
THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 53-58 (1996); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright:
The Metamorphoses of "Authorship," 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, passim.
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In 1984, the Supreme Court relied on the intuitive power of such
reasoning to endorse the view that trade secrets are property for
purposes of due process. Although the discussion of trade secret
doctrine in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto217 is brief, the Supreme Court's
statement that trade secrets are property is unequivocal.2 18 The Court
based its decision that research and test data were property on its
finding that under Missouri law, the data were trade secrets.2 9 The
majority noted that treating trade secrets as property "is consonant
with a notion of 'property' that extends beyond land and tangible
goods." Relying upon a natural rights theory, the Court
emphasized that property includes the products of "labor and
invention."21 That was apparently enough for the Court, and it did
not identify any underlying social policy that is furthered by its
decision to treat trade secrets as property. The Court's commitment
to this proposition is indicated by its effort to distinguish Justice
Holmes's contrary precedent tm
The Court has relied upon and extended Monsanto to find that
confidential business information is a form of property for purposes
of mail and wire fraud. It has also endorsed that view in adopting
217. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
218. See Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1003-04. Monsanto argued that an Environmental
Protection Agency regulation, which required Monsanto to give certain test data to the
agency, resulted in a taking of property without due process in violation of the Fifth
Amendment. See id. at 992-97. The EPA rule required applicants for registration of a
pesticide to present research and test data in support of the application. Id.
219. See id. at 1001. For commentary that disputes this conclusion, see Pamela
Samuelson, Information as Property: Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal a Changing
Direction in Intellectual Property Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365, 380 n.91 (1989)
(pointing out that cases cited by the Milgrim treatise-upon which the Supreme Court
relied-do not support the characterization of trade secrets as property).
220. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1003. The Court appeared most concerned with
disposing of a distinction between tangible and intangible property and noted the term
"property" was not limited to the "vulgar and untechnical sense of the physical thing." See
id. (quoting United States v. General Motors, 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945)). The Court
also noted ways in which trade secrets resemble tangible property. Id. at 1002.
221. See id. at 1003 (quoting 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 405 and citing J.
LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, ch. 5 (J. Goughed ed. 1947)).
222. See id. at 1004 n.9 (arguing that E.I. DuPont De Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland,
244 U.S. 100 (1917), did not deny the existence of a property interest; it stood for the
proposition that a property interest was irrelevant to resolution of the case); supra notes
178-82 and accompanying text (discussing Masland).
223. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26 (1987). The Court noted that
"[c]onfidential business information has long been recognized as property," and cited
Monsanto as well as other cases involving stock prices, Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653
n.10 (1983); Bd. of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 250-51 (1905), and
the news, Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). Carpenter, 484 U.S. at
26.
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the misappropriation theory of insider trading.2 4  In subsequent
cases, the Court has shown a tendency to assume that other nonsecret
information is property.' Notwithstanding this reliance on the
traditional, natural rights of property, applying the theory to trade
secrets does not withstand close analysis.2 6 If the premise of trade
secret doctrine was that trade secrets are a traditional form of
property, one would expect a broad set of rights would be given to
holders of trade secrets, similar to those that attach to physical
products of labor. But trade secret law does not confer a broad set of
property rights; trade secrets are property only in a conditional sense.
As noted earlier, common law does not confer an exclusive right of
224. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997) (stating that information
concerning a plan of one firm to merge with another was property and that the deprivation
of exclusive use of the information merits criminal penalties). The Court ultimately ruled
that the defendant, who had used the information to trade in securities, had committed
securities fraud. See id. at 659.
225. See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 148 (2000) (implying that information on a
driver's license is property by noting that such information is an article in interstate
commerce).
In addition, the Court appears poised to treat rights under patent law as property
for purposes of due process. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll.
Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 642 (1999) (stating that patents are "surely included within the
'property' of which no person may be deprived by a [s]tate without due process"). The
Court nevertheless held that state governments are not subject to due process claims for
patent infringement. See id. (holding that Congress could not seek to remedy a
Fourteenth Amendment violation by abolishing sovereign immunity under the Patent and
Plan Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act).
One should note that section 261 of the patent statute states that, subject to
provisions of the patent statute, patents shall have the attributes of property. 35 U.S.C.
§ 261 (1994) (providing for the assignment of a patent).
226. Reflecting these insights, common law expressly rejects the property basis of trade
secret claims and bases the tort upon the wrongfulness of the actor's conduct. See
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a (1939) (rejecting the property view and stating that
the prevailing theory underlying trade secret protection is a general duty of good faith);
see also id. at cmt. b (explaining that liability for disclosure or use of a trade secret rests
upon abuse of confidence or impropriety in learning the secret). States provide recourse
for loss of trade secrets only when they were taken by improper means or in breach of a
confidential relationship. See supra notes 106-12 and accompanying text (discussing the
element of wrongfulness in a trade secret civil claim).
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use. 27 In further contrast, the owner of a trade secret must take
certain precautions to keep the information a secret.2
Moreover, modem property theory rejects the proposition that
the state protects property rights that already exist. It is axiomatic
that the state affirmatively creates property rights by protecting
interests when it prevents others-through judicial or legislative
action-from using the tangible or intangible objects at issue2 9 The
community, either through legislation or judicial decisions, usually
enforces an interest against others only when doing so furthers a
significant social policyY ° Reflecting these considerations, a second,
more sophisticated theory of property is invoked to support property
rights in trade secrets.
2. Modem Treatment of the Property Justification-Trade Secrets
As Intellectual Property
A more nuanced property justification for trade secret law
analogizes trade secrets to intellectual property and adopts its
underlying utilitarian basis.23' Proponents of this view emphasize the
227. See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text; see also Deutch, supra note 60, at
361-69 (concluding that trade secrets do not convey an in rem property right); Thomas W.
Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REv. 730, 744 (1989) (concluding
that exclusivity is core right of property); John C. Stedman, Trade Secrets, 23 OHIO ST.
LJ. 4, 21 (1962) ("It is, indeed, a strange form of 'property' that disappears when the
information it embraces becomes public or others independently make the same discovery
228. See Deutch, supra note 60, at 332 ("A thief is not heard to claim to the owner that
he, the owner, did not properly guard his property....").
229. See Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929) (noting that
the source of a property right is common lav or statute); see also LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 109 (1993) (stating that
property is a social concept); Morris A. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.
REV. 8, passim (1927) (criticizing eighteenth and nineteenth century formalistic
conception of property); Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.. 733, 771-73
(1964) (stating that property is a legal institution, a deliberate construction rather than a
natural right); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The
Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BuFF. L. REv. 325, 330 (1980)
(noting that in the twentieth century, property was defined as "a set of legal relations").
230. See Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 246 (1918) (opinion per
Holmes, J.) (stating that property designation is dependent upon exclusion by law from
interference); id. at 250 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("[Tlhe attribute of property is
continued.., only in certain classes of cases where public policy has seemed to demand
it."); E.I. DuPont De Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917) (stating
that the designation of property is the result of secondary consequences).
231. Perhaps because of the utilitarian aspect, law and economics scholars have shown
particular interest in intellectual property and have been quite influential. See, e.g.,
Kenneth W. Dam, Intellectual Property in an Age of Software and Biotechnology, in
CHICAGO LECTuREs IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 113, passim (Eric Posner ed. 2000)
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similarities between trade secrets and intellectual property.232 The
property object protected by patent and copyright is intangible, as are
trade secrets. Both intellectual property law and trade secret law deal
with the products of intellectual effort. Most significantly,
proponents of this view claim that trade secret law shares the
utilitarian basis of intellectual property law.
The award of a property right in patents and copyrights is based
on a public policy embodied in the Constitution?3  That policy is
based upon a public interest in progress and innovation.' The state
creates an innovator's limited right of exclusive use only because
enforcement achieves important societal goals.235 The constitutional
(discussing the economic principles that apply to intellectual property); Stanley M. Besen
& Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Intellectual Property, 5 J.
ECON. PERSP. 3, passim (1991) (providing an overview of current economic issues in
intellectual property law); Chiapetta, supra note 171, at 93-116 (advancing a
misappropriations framework for trade secret law); Deutch, supra note 60, at 323 n.41
(listing cases and articles that utilize law and economics approach); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information,
1981 Sup. Cr. REV. 309, passim (analyzing three Supreme Court decisions that involve a
property interest in information); Friedman et al., supra note 171, passim (discussing the
economics of trade secret law); Kitch, supra note 171, passim (applying economic analysis
to justify laws that protect information); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STuD. 325, passim (1999) (explaining
that copyright law is a means of promoting an efficient allocation of resources); J.H.
Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 2432, 2443 (1994) (applying the concept of market failure to explain the expansion of
property rights in information products that do not qualify for patent or copyright
protection).
232. See Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 457-58 (1868) (likening trade secrets to
property such as business goodwill, trademarks, and patents); see also 1 JAGER, supra note
60, § 1.05, at 1-15 (noting that the purpose of trade secret protection includes "the
encouragement of invention and innovation"); Deutch, supra note 60, at 325 (stating that
the aims of trade secret laws are "in harmony with the aims of the laws regarding
intellectual property").
233. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Congress shall have the power "To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Id.
234. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) ("The
primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but '[tjo promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts.'" (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)); United
States v. Bily, 406 F. Supp. 726, 730 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (stating that the policy basis of
intellectual property law is the public benefit of access).
235. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 350 (stating that copyright assures authors' rights to their
original expression in order to achieve the constitutional objective). Thomas Jefferson
rejected a natural rights basis for intellectual property rights and viewed the grant of
exclusive rights as an artificial creation. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 8-9
(1966). Instead, Jefferson recognized a social and economic rationale; patents are a
reward for and an inducement to bring forth new knowledge. Id. Jefferson was reluctant
to give monopoly rights to inventors because he thought the benefits of even a limited
monopoly would not exceed the benefits of competition. Id. at 8 n.2.
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standard thus defines the goals-to provide an incentive to those who
create new work and to provide meaningful access to the general
public.
This policy accepts the proposition that creators are unlikely to
produce new work unless they can control access to the material. In
the language of economics, the subject matter of copyrights and
patents are public goods, vulnerable to free ridersY 6 Legal rules are
necessary because creators may not be able to recoup the investment
of time, prior knowledge, and money that was used to create the
material. Consequently, copyright and patent laws grant a set of
limited rights to developers of creative expression and novel
invention so that they may profit from their innovation and be
motivated to produce more new ideas. The general public benefits
because citizens may buy, use, read, view, and ultimately copy
material that might not otherwise have been available.
In order to achieve innovation without unduly impinging on
public access to and use of the information, intellectual property law
provides only a limited right 7 -and a limited term for that right."5
236. See Landes & Posner, supra note 231, at 326. One definition of a public good rests
on the inexhaustible character of intangibility. Thus: A public good arises when "[e]ach
individual's consumption leads to no subtraction from any other individual's
consumption." DENNIS C. MOELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 12-13 (1979) (quoting Paul A.
Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 386-89
(1954)). A somewhat more relaxed definition of the public good nature of intangible
products rests upon the idea that they are expensive to create and cheap to copy. See
Dam, supra note 231, at 114.
The classic example of a lighthouse has been used by many economists to
illustrate the concept. Private individuals will not build a lighthouse because they could
not charge for its use or recoup the investment. It is therefore necessary for government,
or others through collective action, to provide the service. See R.H. Coase, The
Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & ECON. 357, 357 (1974). Coase demonstrated that
despite the fact that eminent economists, including Mill, Sidgwick, Pigou, and Samuelson,
offered the lighthouse as the quintessential public good, it is not the best vehicle for
analyzing this problem. See id. at 374-76 (noting that English lighthouse owners did
charge shipowners, and that great economists made statements about lighthouses that
were misleading as to the facts, unclear, and wrong in their policy implications).
237. Federal patent law grants the patent holder the right to exclude others from
making, using, selling, or importing the product or process. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)
(1994). Copyright law gives authors the exclusive right to make and sell copies of
expressions of ideas. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
Limitations also apply. For instance, copyrights are subject to fair use by others.
See id. § 107. Once a patent has issued, it is strictly construed so as not to secure any right
beyond that contained in the patent. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S.
225, 230 (1964). But see Warner-Jenkinson Co., v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17,
passim (1997) (adhering to the doctrine of equivalents, which may protect patent holders
against products that do not literally infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim).
238. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (stating that the right of exclusive use of patented
material ends twenty years after the date of application); 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000) (limiting
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In addition, those applying for patent protection must disclose
information to the public in order to obtain the limited right.P9 The
disclosure requirement ensures that individuals other than the
innovator can use information in the public domain to create even
more innovative material.
The Supreme Court endorsed the analogy of trade secrets to
intellectual property in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.240 In
Kewanee, the Court compared the characteristics and purposes of the
laws of trade secrets and patents.24' In holding against preemption of
a state trade secret law, the majority noted that both patent law and
trade secret law encourage invention. 42  Although the Court
acknowledged that trade secret law protects different kinds of
invention than patent law, it concluded that trade secret law still
played an important part in advancing technology and science. 43
C. Congress Adopted the Property View in the EEA
In one sense, criminalizing misappropriation of trade secrets (or
providing a cause of action in tort) implicitly treats the interest at
issue as property. Even when the focus of a criminal law is to punish
certain conduct, the property approach is implicated; condemning
conduct that involves some interest inevitably sweeps that interest
into a protected category.244  In protecting those interests,
criminalization confers an implicit property right: that which is stolen
must be property. In the case of the EEA, however, Congress's
adoption of the property basis was more explicit. Although the EEA
prohibits a broad range of behavior, Congress does not appear to
copyright to the life of the author plus seventy years); see also Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d
372,377-78 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (rejecting arguments that the Copyright Term Extension Act
violated the Constitution), cert. granted - S. Ct. -, 70 USLW (2002).
239. 35 U.S.C. § 112; see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S.
141, 151 (1989) (stating that the ultimate goal of the patent system is to bring new
technology into the public domain through disclosure).
240. 416 U.S. 470, 493 (1974); see supra notes 199-204 and accompanying text
(presenting the view in Kewanee Oil Co. that trade secret law enhances the competitive
process).
241. See Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 480-93 (stating that the major goals are to
promote science and useful arts and fairness to inventors).
242. See id. at 485 (explaining that trade secret law will "prompt] the innovator to
proceed with discovery and exploitation of his invention").
243. See id. at 493 (stating that trade secret law encourages development of items of
lesser or different invention than those accorded protection under patent law).
244. For a more detailed exposition of this observation, see Moohr, supra note 20, at
724. Consider also that the effect of barring one who had not labored from reaping a
benefit created a "quasi-property right" in the news. See Int'l News Serv. v. Associated
Press, 248 U.S. 215,236 (1918).
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have been motivated by a desire to maintain commercial morality or
to prevent unfair competition. Rather, in the view of Congress, trade
secrets are much like any other property.2 45
Congress effectively gave "owners" the right to control any use
of the information-a right that approaches exclusive use.246  The
person or entity holding a trade secret can authorize certain uses, and
unauthorized use undertaken with the requisite mental state is a
crime.2 47 Congress stopped short of creating an explicit in rem
property right; instead, trade secrets are protected as property only
when specified conduct and culpability are present. Yet the broad
range of prohibited acts, which effectively prohibit any unauthorized
use, imply that the trade secret holder does have rights against the
world at large.
Congress undoubtedly was influenced by the value of secret
information and its importance to the economy, and may have
equated value with property. The concern over value, however, is
problematic for two reasons. In this specific case, the estimated
financial value of lost information cannot be considered as entirely
reliable, in part because the estimates vary so wildly as to be
suspect.24s The estimates of lost value are often based on an
245. See Pooley et al., supra note 30, at 193 (concluding that Congress believed trade
secret law is rooted in property theory).
246. The statute speaks of "owner." 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A) (2000). The statute
defines "owner" as corresponding to legal title and includes licensees. Id § 1839(4); see
also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Trade Secrets: How Well Should We Be Allowed to Hide
Them? The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 9 FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 1, 8 (1998) (noting that the concept of owner, as opposed to rights holder, is
unknown in state trade secret law). Congress also used the word "theft," § 1832 (entitled
"Theft of trade secrets"), implying that what is taken is property.
Congress utilized the concept of conversion to describe the prohibited conduct, a
concept that normally applies only to tangible property. I& § 1832(a). In civil law, takings
of intangibles are treated as misappropriation and require a confidential relationship. See
Parks v. Int'l Harvester Co., 218 U.S.P.Q. 189, 190 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (applying Illinois law
and stating that the tort of misappropriation of an intangible idea requires a confidential
relationship and that conversion applies to tangible property); BLACK'S LAW
DICrIONARY 333 (7th ed. 1999) (defining conversion as applying to personal property);
Jeff C. Dodd, Rights in Information: Conversion and Misappropriation Causes of Action
in Intellectual Property Cases, 32 Hous. L. REv. 459, 475-97 (1995) (reviewing civil suits
for conversion and misappropriation of ideas); see also Morissette v. United States, 342
U.S. 246, 272 (1952) (stating that conversion prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 641 is misuse or
abuse of property or its use in an unauthorized manner). But see United States v. Girard,
601 F.2d 69, 71 (Conn. 1979) (holding that a writing is a thing of value subject to
conversion under 18 U.S.C. § 641).
247. See 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(1)-(3) (specifying acts taken "without authorization");
supra notes 158-62 and accompanying text (discussing conduct provisions).
248. See David R. Hofman, The Economic Espionage Act-Congress' Inadequate
Solution to Trade Secret Protection 8 (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
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assumption that infringers would have purchased the object if it was
not otherwise available, and there is no evidence that this is the
case.2 49 Moreover, self-interested parties provided the estimates of
losses, and their conclusions should be viewed skeptically .2 0
Another more general problem is that relying on value to
determine whether an object is property is circular: an object has
market value in large part because legislators or courts have given
some individual or entity the right to exclude others from using itl 5'
Even if value were a valid standard for deeming an object worth
protecting, it is axiomatic that criminal law does not guard every
valuable interest. 2
The utilitarian property justification upon which Congress relied,
that trade secret law serves the same general policy goal as
intellectual property, is also unsatisfactory. Trade secret doctrine is
not entirely analogous to patent law because it does not-and is not
intended to-further one of the underlying purposes of intellectual
property law. Trade secret law does not achieve the second purpose
North Carolina Law Review) (noting estimates of monetary loss to U.S. industries from
economic espionage ranged from $1.8 billion to $100 billion per year); see also supra note
52 (listing estimates).
249. See, e.g., Todd H. Flaming, Comment, The National Stolen Property Act and
Computer Files: A New Form of Property, A New Form of Theft, 1993 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 255, 287 (providing a hypothetical problem of ascertaining value that
assumes people who download software programs from the Internet would have paid for
them).
250. Representatives from the American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS)
testified before Congress. ASIS is a trade organization of security businesses "dedicated
to increasing the effectiveness and productivity of security professionals." American
Society for Industrial Security, at http://www.asisonline.org/member.html (last visited on
Nov. 19, 2001) (copy on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Its members are
companies and their representatives who provide security services to business firms.
Telephone interview with Gail Shisler, Executive Assistant to the Executive Director
(Sept. 28, 2000).
251. See Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 246 (1918) (opinion per
Holmes, J.) ("Property, a creation of law, does not arise from value .. "); Felix S. Cohen,
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 809, 815
(1935) (characterizing the value argument as fatally circular); Gordon, supra note 209, at
178 (noting that the value argument has so little reason in it that response is difficult);
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16,21-23 (1913).
252. See JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO
OTHERS 218-21 (1984) (discussing harm to competitive interests). Tellingly, there is no
criminal provision for infringement of a patent, although patent holders may receive treble
damages upon a finding of willful infringement. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994). Only about
one half of the states specifically criminalize trade secret theft. See supra notes 113-25 and
accompanying text (discussing state criminal enforcement).
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of intellectual property law: provide public access to knowledge and
information.
In contrast to intellectual property law, owners of trade secrets
do not divulge information to the public 3 The obligation of patent
and copyright applicants to disclose becomes, in trade secret law, the
opposite-an incentive to conceal. Not only do holders of trade
secrets have no obligation to disclose, they lose all rights in the secret
information if they should do so. Thus, the bargain of intellectual
property, in which creators receive the benefit of exclusive use in
return for disclosure to the community, is not present in trade secret
law3 4  When information is treated as a trade secret, the public
benefit is limited to the opportunity to purchase a product that
embodies secret information. The underlying information is not
available to the public. The community thus cannot benefit from
future innovation based upon it, with its possible consequences for
increased competition.255
The procedures required to obtain a patent are also pertinent to
the argument that trade secret doctrine is not entirely analogous to
patent law. Patent law provides a screening process that limits the
grant of exclusive use only to certain inventionsY 6 The statutory
standards reflect the purpose of encouraging science and the useful
arts, and legislators designed them to achieve the constitutional
mandate to balance the creation and use of intellectual property. 7 In
contrast, no screening process or legislative action exists in the law of
trade secrets-any information can be a trade secret. Unbound by
statutory standards, the innovator decides what information will be
protected by unilaterally deciding to keep valuable information
secret. This method of creating a right in a trade secret may be
253. Note, however, that disclosure may occur through independent discovery, reverse
engineering, or accidental disclosure. See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text
(discussing paradox of trade secrets).
254. Despite its emphasis on the common goals of trade secret and intellectual
property laws in Kewanee, the Supreme Court conceded that trade secret law does not
produce the benefits of disclosure. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. 416 U.S. 470,484
(1974) (noting that the disclosure required by patent law is the "more difficult objective"
to reconcile with trade secret law).
255. See Martin J. Adelman, Secrecy and Patenting: Some Proposals for Resolving the
Conflict, 1 AM. PAT. L. ASS'N Q.J. 296, 299-300 (1973) (noting that the public right to a
competitive economy is furthered by disclosure).
256. Patents protect discoveries and inventions if they are novel, useful, and not
obvious. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-105 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
257. See supra notes 233-35 and accompanying text (observing that the purpose of
copyright law is to secure public benefit).
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appropriate when the right is limited and precarious; it seems less so
when a broader, stronger right is at issue.
Finally, the breadth of information protected by trade secret law
further weakens the intellectual property analogy. The information
protected by trade secret law inevitably includes material that does
not satisfy the criteria implicit in the utilitarian standard-that the
property is a public good. Under the EEA, any secret information
qualifies for protection1 8 Because the EEA covers information that
does not require artificial protection and stimulation provided by
granting a monopoly right, it is over-inclusive259 In some cases-such
as formulas for medical drugs-investors may not support
development of the product without some assurance of recouping the
investment. But in other cases-such as a client list or a
manufacturing method-a company would produce the information
for its use even in the absence of legal protection.260 In short, the
market does not always fail when an intangible product is involved.
The market often provides abundant incentives for businesses to
create a great range of information without statutory protection.26'
In sum, the property right provided by the EEA is contrary in
spirit and effect to the underlying principles that support the limited
rights authorized by intellectual property law. Trade secret doctrine
is better understood as a mechanism for ensuring a competitive
standard that redresses unfair enrichment while supporting vigorous
competition. In basing the EEA on property, Congress over-
258. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2000) (requiring that information has value due to
secrecy and that the owner made reasonable efforts to secure secrecy).
259. This concern underlies criticism of the Patent and Trademark Office policy of
approving business methods patents. See Leo J. Raskind, The State Street Bank Decision:
The Bad Business of Unlimited Patent Protection for Methods of Doing Business, 10
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 61, 102 (1999) (critiquing the award of
patents for business methods on grounds of economic policy).
260. See Abbott Labs. v. Norse Chem. Corp., 147 N.W.2d 529, 541 (Wis. 1967) (noting
that customer lists are peripheral because legal protection does not provide as much
incentive to compile them and because most are developed in the normal course of
business anyway). Consider that computer software was continuously and rapidly
produced before it was considered eligible for protection by copyright or patent. Consider
also that Dr. J. S. Pemberton created and sold Coca-Cola (and also trademarked and sold
the formula) before Georgia courts recognized a right in trade secrets. See Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 563 F. Supp. 1122, 1124 (D. Del. 1983) (noting that Coca-
Cola syrup was created in 1886, the drink was registered as a trademark in 1887, and the
formula was sold to Asa Chandler for $2,300 in 1888); Stewart v. Hook, 45 S.E. 369, 370
(Ga. 1903) (establishing protection of trade secrets).
261. See Moohr, supra note 20, at 735 (discussing the public good justification and
noting that the profit incentive provided by markets is typically an adequate inducement
to produce general business information).
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simplified the issues and, in responding to the interests of those who
already hold valuable information, tilted the public balance away
from efficient use of information.
V. CONSEQUENCES OF USING CRIMINAL LAW
Congress's stated goal in passing the Economic Espionage Act
was to promote the general economic well-being of the nation.262 To
achieve that goal, Congress treated trade secrets as an
undifferentiated kind of property and criminalized their
misappropriation. The following exploration of likely consequences
of those decisions reveals that Congress may have been misguided.
Criminalizing trade secret takings is a double-edged sword; while the
EEA may deter such takings, unintended consequences of
enforcement may very well undermine the goal of economic growth.
The issue is familiar; protecting trade secrets in order to encourage
innovation is not costless. One cost of enhanced rights in trade
secrets is that exercising those rights impedes the ability of employees
to take jobs in other firms or to start new businesses. Loss of
employee mobility leads to another cost, or inefficiency, by affecting
regional economic performance. The following section also analyzes
likely effects of the EEA on the public domain and on intellectual
property law. Contrary to Congress's expectations, criminal
protection of trade secrets is more likely to impede economic
progress than to promote it.
A. The EEA May Restrain Employee Mobility and Economic
Growth
Firms whose profits depend upon trade secrets typically consider
their workers a potential threat to the firm's interests. Indeed, one
would not be wrong in concluding that the historical impetus for trade
secret law was to restrain employees from competing with their
employers. 263 Although the incongruent interests of employees and
employers are well understood,264 the trade secret issue raises a
262. See supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text (discussing the passage of the
EEA).
263. See BOK, supra note 60, at 137-38 (discussing the efforts of French and German
producers to keep secret the methods for producing porcelain-methods they had taken
from the Chinese-that included treating workers as prisoners).
264. Various agency doctrines (for example, employee loyalty and fiduciary duty) and
contract doctrines (such as covenants not to compete) seek to accommodate competing
interests of employers and employees. MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW
642-70 (2d ed. 1999) (presenting post-employment obligations of employees).
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special application that involves a societal interest. Firms have an
interest in maintaining their competitive advantage by keeping trade
secrets and business information from their competitors. 6-
Employees, on the other hand, want the freedom to work for
whichever business values them most highly.266 Not so obviously, the
community has an independent interest in a sound and growing
economy that may be aligned with either interest.2 67 This section
explains how the EEA, while accounting for the interest of
employers, falls short of accommodating either the interests of
employees or the long-term interests of the community.
1. How the EEA May Restrain Employee Mobility
Employees benefit from the ability to move among employers.
For one thing, taking advantage of opportunities for employment
increases income, and the practical repercussions of losing job
opportunities can harm employees and their families. Moreover,
employee bargaining positions are diminished when they cannot
move to the employer who values them most highly.2 6 Thus, when an
employer is given a property interest in the skills that an employee
265. See Winston Research Corp. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 137-38
(9th Cir. 1965) (noting the competing policies and interests of employees and employers in
California law).
266. For discussions of how protecting information may affect employee mobility, see
Chatterjee, supra note 212, at 889 (noting that economic inefficiency results when
employees cannot work where they are most valued); John C. Coffee, Hush!: The
Criminal Status of Confidential Information After McNally and Carpenter and the
Enduring Problem of Overcriminalization, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 121, 139 (1988) (noting
that restricting the use of information through criminal penalties reduces bargaining
power of employees); Dreyfuss, supra note 246, at 39 (explaining how the EEA may affect
employee mobility); Kitch, supra note 85, at 664 (stating that expanded trade secrecy
protection infringes employee mobility); Moohr, supra note 20, at 728-30 (noting
restrictions on employee mobility when federal fraud statutes are applied to information).
267. See Winston, 350 F.2d at 137-38 (noting the advantages of the public policy
favoring disclosure); Brunswick Corp. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 404 N.E.2d 205,207 (Ill.
1980) (noting the public interest "in allowing employees to make full use of their
knowledge and ability"); Wexler v. Greenberg, 160 A.2d 430, 433-35 (Pa. 1960) (stating
that "competition is diminished by slackening the dissemination of ideas, processes and
methods" and noting harm to public in "forestalling widespread technological advances").
The public interest may be aligned with the firm because of benefits of
technological improvements. The prospect of such improvements is based in part on the
ability to entrust information to employees, and optimum trusting may not occur unless
losses due to breaches of trust are held to a minimum. See Wexler, 160 A.2d at 433-35.
268. See Wexler, 160 A.2d at 435 (noting that an "employee's bargaining position is
weakened because he is potentially shackled by the acquisition of trade secrets; and thus,
paradoxically, he is restrained because of his increased expertise from advancing further in
the industry in which he is most productive").
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learned on the job, fundamental rights of employees may be
violated.
2 69
A general consequence of using criminal law as a regulatory
device is that its blunt determinations can deter lawful, as well as
unlawful, conduct 0  Risk-averse and law-abiding citizens may
eschew legitimate and socially valuable activities in order to avoid
criminal charges, which imposes significant social costs on individuals
and on the economy? 1  Thus, when employees avoid legitimate
activities-such as moving to other firms or beginning new
businesses-economic progress is impeded, rather than augmented.
Congress apparently recognized this possibility and explicitly
stated that it did not intend to prevent employees from using general
skills and knowledge when they left an employer 2  Congress's
disclaimer is, however, somewhat disingenuous. As one commentator
has pointed out, Congress explicitly identified employees as the main
threat with which it was concerned 7  Moreover, the disclaimer is
negated by the EEA itself: Congress enlarged the scope of what
qualifies as a trade secret and broadened the conduct that triggers
criminal charges.274 As a result of this broad coverage, employees will
269. See AMP, Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199, 1202 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that
individuals maintain a fundamental right to pursue particular occupations); Allis-
Chambers Mfg. Co. v. Cont'l Aviation & Eng'g Corp., 255 F. Supp. 645, 652-53 (E.D.
Mich. 1966) (considering freedom of employees to move); Smith Oil Corp. v. Viking
Chem. Co., 468 N.E.2d 797, 800 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (recognizing the right of an individual
"to follow and pursue a particular occupation").
270. See HERBERT L. PACKER, TBE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCrION 69
(Stanford Univ. Press 1978) (1968) (arguing that "the singular power of the criminal law
resides.., not in its coercive effect on those caught in its toils but rather in its effect on the
rest of us").
271. See Coffee, supra note 266, at 151-52 (noting that avoiding entanglements with
criminal law entails significant "compliance costs").
272. See 142 CONG. REC. S12,212 (1996) (Manager's Statement) (stating that the EEA
does not in any way prohibit others from using their skills, knowledge, and experience to
solve a problem or invent a product that they know someone else is working on); S. REP.
No. 104-359, at 12 (1996); H.R. REP. No. 104-788, at 18-19 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021, 4026 ("The statute is not intended to be used to prosecute employees
who change employers or start their own companies using general knowledge and skills
developed while employed.").
273. See Dreyfuss, supra note 246, at 37-38 (citing S. REP. No. 104-359, at 8, 18 (1996);
H.R. REP. No. 104-788, at 5, 7 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021, 4023 & 4021,
4026) (pointing to legislative history that refers to employees and insiders and concluding
that the EEA "was quite definitely targeted at employees")). Although conduct is not
limited to persons in confidential relationships with the trade secret holder, employees are
likely to be in a position to engage in many of the prohibited acts, such as photographing,
copying, or otherwise communicating the information to others. See id at 38.
274. The EEA authorizes punishment for unauthorized use of a trade secret even if the
person had lawfully acquired it. See 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(2) (2000); supra notes 158-62 and
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be less likely to consider moving to other firms because they will be
afraid of incurring criminal charges.
Employees traditionally acquire the general skills and knowledge
necessary to move to better jobs or start independent businesses by
learning from their work. 75 But the chilling of employee mobility
that flows from the EEA's broad statutory provisions is sharpened by
the difficulty of ascertaining the blurred and context-dependent line
between information that belongs to the firm and that which belongs
to the employee. 76 The inherent ambiguity between these categories
is heightened because the existence of a trade secret is not established
until trial2 77 Because of this uncertainty, and the harsh consequences
that could follow from an error of judgment, employees are likely to
err on the side of caution.27 8
accompanying text (discussing conduct provision). Further, the EEA appears to include
taking information through memorization. See § 1832(a)(2); supra notes 130-31 and
accompanying text (noting the EEA provision that prohibits taking trade secrets through
memorization).
275. See Kitch, supra note 85, at 665 (noting that under the traditional common law
view ex-employees' use of information that was "simply in his or her head was not viewed
as improper").
276. Common law distinguishes between protected information, or firm-specific
knowledge, that employees may not disclose to others, and unprotected information,
general knowledge and skill, that they are free to use in other employment. See Ram
Metals Corp. v. Logan, 565 P.2d 1080, 1083 (Or. 1977) (stating the common law rule that
use of general knowledge and skill obtained during employment may not be restrained by
the employer in the absence of special circumstances); see also GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN
CAPITAL 11, 18 (1964) (discussing general and specific on the job training); Kitch, supra
note 85, at 666 (noting that the "critical but unanswered question in the employment
context is what obligations of confidence the employment contract creates"); Paul H.
Rubin & Peter Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not to Compete, 10 J. LEGAL STUD.
93,passim (1981) (examining the economics of training markets).
277. See Dreyfuss, supra note 246, at 38 (noting that Congress did not provide a
method to determine what is proprietary knowledge and what is merely a skill); Ronald J.
Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley,
Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 575,599 (1999) (noting the
imprecision of the line between general knowledge and knowledge that qualifies as a trade
secret).
278. Courts have erred on the side of holders of trade secrets by adopting the
inevitable disclosure doctrine. See Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1268 (7th Cir.
1995). The doctrine allows an employer to prevent a former employee from working for a
competitor upon a showing that the employee will inevitably disclose the former
employer's trade secrets in the new job. See id. at 1269-70 (holding that the inevitable
disclosure doctrine applied to a former Pepsi employee who knew of Pepsi's particularized
strategic goals and strategies for getting ahead in the sports drink industry). Some
commentators fear that the EEA will cover inevitable disclosure. See Dreyfuss, supra
note 246, at 36-37 (suggesting the possibility that the EEA may also cover inevitable
disclosure); Savage et al., supra note 56, at 17 (noting that the combination of the
inevitable disclosure doctrine and the EEA increases the probability that movement of an
employee to a competitor can trigger a criminal prosecution).
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In addition, the third-party provision of the EEA may reduce
employment opportunities for experienced workers. The EEA
imposes criminal liability on third parties who knowingly possess or
receive a trade secret.279 Unless the knowledge provision is strictly
interpreted, a firm that hires a competitor's employee risks a criminal
charge. 10 In addition, the hiring firm risks incurring corporate
liability even when a worker uses a former employer's trade secret
without the knowledge of the hiring firm; firms can be held
responsible for acts of agents that benefit the firm and are within the
scope of the agent's authority.81 These risks are likely to discourage
prudent managers from hiring competitors' workers. Given the
substantial fines that result from a criminal conviction,' potential
employers would be foolish to expose their firms to that risk by hiring
workers who might know the trade secrets of former employers.
Despite Congress's avowed intention, criminal penalties of the EEA
are likely to reduce opportunities of experienced employees, to
dissuade them from looking for new opportunities, and to chill
enthusiasm for moving to new jobs-even when a court would decide
that that no trade secret existed.
2. The Community Interest in Employee Mobility
The community benefits when employees are free to move to
new jobs. The firm that values employees most highly can
presumably use them most effectively, leading to more output of
goods or services from the same resources, which can increase overall
279. 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(3) (2000) (requiring that the third party acts with knowledge
that the information was taken without authorization).
280. See supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text (discussing the mens rea elements
of the EEA).
281. See New York Cent. R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494 (1909) (holding a
corporation responsible for acts of agents on behalf of the corporation); United States v.
Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding corporations responsible
for violations of the Sherman Act by their employees acting within the scope of their
employment); Commonwealth v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 275 N.E.2d 33, 71-74 (Mass. 1971)
(comparing the common-law respondeat superior standard and the Model Penal Code
standard for finding corporate liability); see also Alexander & Wood, supra note 30, at 920
(noting that criminal charges against the new firm arguably could result from the
perceived undue pressure on employees to develop new products that leads an employee
to steal information from a competitor).
The conspiracy provision may also be troublesome to new employers.
§ 1832(a)(5); see Alexander & Wood, supra note 30, at 920 (noting that hiring a
competitor's employees without proper safeguards in place may create an appearance of
an agreement to steal trade secrets from the former employer).
282. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (detailing organizational fines of up to
five million dollars and forfeiture provisions).
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economic well-being.23 In addition, employee mobility can reduce
monopoly power or the possibility of such power, and that benefits
the community by lowering prices to consumers. Competition is
enhanced when employees are free to move to the firm that values
their talents and skills most highly. Indeed, this insight underlies the
skepticism with which the law regards non-compete agreements.2 4
Hiring only inexperienced workers or building firewalls around
experienced new hires hinders the flow of all ideas and innovation-
protected or not.S Restricting employment opportunities in this way
also reduces the bargaining strength of employees as they negotiate
salaries and other benefits, leading to lower salaries, a development
that economic theory teaches will lead to a reduction in the number
of people willing to work.86 Thus, even when restricting employee
choices may be good for the individual employer, it is not necessarily
good for the community.
Constraining employee mobility may also implicate the public
interest in economic growth in a more direct way. Recent research by
Professor Ronald Gilson and by Professor Alan Hyde specifically
links employee mobility and economic growth. 7 Their studies are
based on the performance of two regions between 1965 and 1995:
Silicon Valley in California generally prospered while Route 128 in
Massachusetts did not.S The research indicates that the ability of
employees to move freely between employers and to start their own
businesses contributed to the better performance of Silicon Valley.28 9
In contrast to Massachusetts, engineers and managers in California
283. See WILLIAM H. HUTT, THE ECONOMICS OF THE COLOUR BAR 1 (1964).
284. See, e.g., DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 688 (Tex. 1990)
(discussing the application of the rule of reason to an anticompete agreement);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (1981) (presenting the rule of reason
factors that may invalidate a covenant not to compete); Harlan M. Blake, Employee
Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 652 (1960) (stating that the risk of
future competition from employees falls upon employers).
285. See Dreyfuss, supra note 246, at 38-39. Professor Dreyfuss also points out that the
threat of criminal charges will chill corporate restructuring and joint ventures. Id. at 40.
286. See id. at 39.
287. See Gilson, supra note 277, at 595-96 (analyzing ANNALEE SAXENIAN,
REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND
ROUTE 128 (1994); Alan Hyde, Real Human Capital: The Economics and Law of Shared
Knowledge (May 1998) (unpublished manuscript on file with the North Carolina Law
Review)); Alan Hyde, The Wealth of Shared Information: Silicon Valley's High-Velocity
Labor Market, Endogenous Economic Growth, and the Law of Trade Secrets (1998), at
http://andromeda.rutgers.edu/-hyde/WEALTH.htm (copy on file with the North Carolina
Law Review) [hereinafter Silicon Valley].
288. See Gilson, supra note 277, at 587 (noting that Silicon Valley firms far surpassed
Route 128 firms in increased employment, use of technology, and exports).
289. See id. at 590-91.
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moved among firms, began start-up companies, and developed
personal and professional relationships that cut across companies and
competitors.2 9'
Professor Gilson and Professor Hyde suggest that the
performance of Silicon Valley is a function of California's legal
infrastructure, which generally did not limit employee mobility as
strictly as did Massachusetts. 2 91 They agree that the dynamic of
employee mobility promoted economic performance of the Silicon
Valley region as a whole.2 2 The movement of employees between
firms allowed companies to specialize. Small, specialized firms
succeeded because they were able to utilize a network of associates
who worked for suppliers or who were customers, relying on them to
provide needed products and services.2 93 Freed from the need to
vertically integrate or become a technological leader in all phases of
production, entry into the market was less costly. On the whole, the
computer industry in Silicon Valley benefited from knowledge
spillovers between companies, which enhanced innovation and
flexibility.294 The broader community thus reaped benefits when
employers had access to the knowledge of, and services from,
experienced employees who may have been hired away from other
firms. 295  This real-life experiment illustrates the benefits of
maintaining effective, efficient use of information. As the California
model illustrates, impeding employee mobility to protect employers'
interests may conflict with the collective interest in economic growth,
imposing significant costs on the community as well as on individual
employees.2
290. See id. at 590; SAXENIAN, supra note 287, at 34-38 (noting that California business
culture reflected nonlinear career patterns and a special status for entrepreneurs).
291. See Gilson, supra note 277, at 611-13 (attributing the success of Silicon Valley to
the fact that California had sufficiently weakened trade secret protection); Silicon Valley,
supra note 287 (attributing the success of Silicon Valley to a legal culture that effectively
abolished trade secret law).
292. See Gilson, supra note 277, at 591.
293. See id. (noting California's advantage that success of a single firm did not depend
on leading in technology at every stage of production).
294. See id. at 619 (noting that, in contrast to companies in Silicon Valley, firms along
Route 128 in Massachusetts adjusted more slowly to market trends); see also Rebecca
Achee Thornton & Peter Thompson, Learning from Experience and Learning from
Others: An Exploration of Learning and Spillovers in Wartime Shipbuilding, 91 AM.
ECON. REV. 1350, 1350 (2001) (reporting that data suggests learning spillovers are a
significant source of productivity growth).
295. See Gilson, supra note 277, at 620.
296. Neel Chatterjee has noted that the statute may have additional anticompetitive
effects because it can be purposefully used by those who hold trade secrets to reduce
competition. See Chatterjee, supra note 212, at 890-92 (stating that the EEA creates
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In sum, the EEA may directly restrain employees from seeking
other employment opportunities, and indirectly limit mobility by
discouraging potential employers from hiring experienced workers.
When legal rules impede competition between employers for
qualified workers in this way, the broader community interest in
economic well-being is unlikely to be served. At first blush, it may
seem odd to conclude that a statute that was designed to foster
economic growth may actually retard growth. Yet a reduction in
employee mobility can contribute to that effect. Another perverse
consequence of the EEA is that it may ultimately cause a reduction in
the amount of creative work that is produced.
B. The EEA May Reduce the Creation of Innovative Products and
Ideas
This Article has shown that the EEA creates new rights by
considering more information as a trade secret, specifically by
including information that is not known by the general public and
information that is electronically stored. 7 The EEA also strengthens
the rights of holders of trade secrets by giving them the right to utilize
government power against interlopers. The right to invoke criminal
authority of the federal government is a powerful weapon-a very
large arrow in the proverbial quiver of property rights. The previous
discussion showed how fear of that arrow can keep employees from
moving to other firms and starting their own businesses.
In the same manner, the aversion to risk criminal charges can
also keep second-generation innovators from using information that
may be a trade secret. Because of the chilling effect of criminal law,
innovators may believe that information subject to free use is a trade
secret-even when it is not. Again, the fact that this determination is
not made until trial enlarges this deterrent effect-prudent innovators
will not want to risk the possibility that information they need is a
trade secret. Moreover, expanding the rights of the trade secret
holder may also ultimately lead to a reduction in the creation of
innovative products as less information reaches the public domain
where it may be used by other innovators.
incentives to use prosecution to keep competitors from entering the market and to reduce
the cost of maintaining secrecy).




1. The EEA Changes Key Characteristics of Trade Secrets
Recall that common law rights in trade secrets are inherently
precarious because holders of trade secrets are not guaranteed
exclusive use of secret information.298 Unlike a patent holder, the
holder of a trade secret has no recourse when others discover the
secret information by fair and honest means, through independent
invention, reverse engineering, or accidental disclosure. These
limitations, as well as the normal attrition that occurs when trade
secrets are licensed, products used, and employees move on, mean
that trade secret law is inherently leaky, allowing information
gradually to seep into the public domain.299
As Professor Dreyfuss points out, the leaky nature of trade
secrets serves purposes that are consistent with public policy? °°
Because subsequent creators eventually have access to trade secrets,
the community obtains innovations in secondary uses of the protected
information that can be valuable in a way that the original creator did
not foresee 0 1 In addition, thin trade secret protection helps to avoid
an offset problem, in which the encouragement given to the creator of
an information product is simply offset by higher costs and
obstruction faced by subsequent creators, with no net benefit to the
community 0 2 The contingent nature of trade secrets thus serves
important functions that may be undermined by a comprehensive
property right in trade secrets, especially one enforced through
federal criminal sanctions. 30 3  The EEA, by broadening and
strengthening rights in trade secrets, generally makes trade secret law
less leaky so that secret information is not apt to reach the public
domain.
A more specific way the EEA may make trade secrets less leaky
is that it bars acts, such as copying, that are necessary to reverse
engineer a product.30° Reverse engineering, a legally accepted
298. See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text (discussing broad characteristics of
common law trade secrets).
299. In the words of the Supreme Court, trade secret law operates as a "sieve."
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. 416 U.S. 470,490 (1974).
300. See Dreyfuss, supra note 246, at 33-36.
301. See id. at 34-35.
302. See id. at 34.
303. See id. at 36 (stating that the EEA makes trade secrets less contingent).
304. See id. at 15 (noting that read literally, the EEA prohibits specific methods of
scrutiny, such as downloading, decompiling, and copying a software program); Pooley et
al., supra note 30, at 192-93 (noting prohibited conduct and stating that the EEA prohibits
a broader range of conduct than civil trade secret laws); Uhrich, supra note 50, at 150-69
(discussing the chilling effects that the EEA could have on creative efforts due to the
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practice, is generally viewed as crucial to maintaining access to
information;305 when knowledge is uncovered in this way, the holder's
trade secret rights are not violated. If the EEA is interpreted to
restrain reverse engineering, trade secret rights become more robust.
Outlawing reverse engineering would profoundly expand trade
secret protection by significantly increasing the holder's rights in the
information.0 6 Specifically, a ban on reverse engineering would
lengthen the time in which trade secret holders can exploit the
information and increase the likelihood that a trade secret could last
forever. Criminalizing reverse engineering would block a major
pipeline through which trade secrets eventually enter the public
domain, leaving only independent discovery and use by others to
effect this passage.
A ban on reverse engineering thus affects the public policy of
intellectual property that favors disclosure by decreasing the
likelihood that secret information will become available to the
public. 307 Congress arguably did not intend to outlaw reverse
engineering, and the issue has not reached the courts.38 But even if
courts eventually interpret the EEA to permit reverse engineering,
the prospect of criminal penalties may well chill competitors from
engaging in the practice because the statute would still seem to ban it.
Either through over-deterrence or by making less material available,
the EEA is likely to discourage second-generation innovators from
using information that could be subject to trade secret protection.
confusion surrounding the legality of reverse engineering under the EEA); supra notes
158-62 and accompanying text (discussing conduct provisions).
305. Reverse engineering is the process of studying an item, the rights of which are
held by another, in order to obtain a detailed understanding of the way in which it works.
See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974) (defining reverse
engineering as a method that begins with the known product and works backward to
divine the process that aided in its development or manufacture).
306. A ban on reverse engineering would eliminate its functional benefits, namely,
spurring innovation, encouraging innovators to rely on patent and copyright protection,
limiting lead time that trade secret law protects, and providing a means for second-comers
to circumvent harsh or abusive licensing practices. See Charles R. McManis, Taking Trips
on the Information Superhighway: International Intellectual Property Protection and
Emerging Computer Technology, 41 VILL. L. REv. 207,224 (1996).
307. See Friedman et al., supra note 171, at 70-71 (stating that comprehensively
protecting trade secrets as property would be tantamount to a perpetual patent law
without public disclosure).
308. Resolution of the issue is not entirely free from doubt. The language of the
statute does not appear ambiguous, so courts would not find it necessary to refer to the
legislative history. Even were they to do so, however, disposition of the issue is an open
question. See 142 CONG. REC. S12,212-13 (1996) (statement of Sen. Kohl) (stating that
the issue is whether the accused committed a prohibited act and endorsing a limited type
of reverse engineering).
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2. Strengthened Rights in Trade Secrets May Reduce Reliance on
Patents
The broader and stronger rights provided by the EEA may tempt
some holders of valuable secret information to rely less on patent law
and more on trade secret protection. Trade secrets have always been
an attractive option to developers of information products, whether
from necessity or for reasons of expediency.3 9 Some developers may
not be able to obtain a patent because the information at issue may
not satisfy specific statutory requirements.310 Even if the information
is eligible for patent protection, developers may not always be able to
afford, or be willing to spend, the time and money necessary to secure
a patent and, possibly, to defend it against infringement.311 Finally,
they may not wish to disclose any information, a necessary step in
obtaining a patent, or want to relinquish the right of exclusive use
when the statutory patent term expires.
Unlike patented information, trade secret protection-at least in
theory-can last forever. Patents offer a stronger set of rights against
others, but for a short and fixed term. Thus, trade secrets have been
viewed as complementing patent law.312 The EEA moves that
complementary function nearer to an alternative and competing
substitution for patent law. By strengthening rights in trade secrets,
Congress has added a significant incentive that is likely to encourage
some innovators to rely less on patent law and more on trade secret
law. Were this to occur, because a trade secret may last forever and
because the holder has no obligation to disclose information, less
information would enter the public domain.
This consequence is clearly contrary to the federal policy
favoring disclosure that is expressed in copyright and patent laws.
The Supreme Court, in seeking to maintain the balance between
trade secrets and patents and copyrights, has registered concern with
309. See Deutch, supra note 60, at 313 (noting the increased importance of trade secret
law because it is more flexible and general and therefore more easily applied to new
technologies); Friedman et al., supra note 171, at 63 (explaining circumstances in which an
inventor may prefer trade secret protection).
310. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1994) (defining patentable inventions, setting
conditions for novelty and loss of right to patent, and setting conditions for non-
obviousness); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,476-77 (1974) (outlining the
requirements of novelty, utility, and non-obviousness for patent protection).
311. See Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir.
1991) (commenting that patent protection is "costly and temporary").
312. See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 63, at 10.
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such a reordering of protection. 13 Despite existing statutory policy
and the Court's concern, Congress may have inadvertently tipped the
balance toward use of trade secrets and away from the use of
patents. 4
The creation of new work typically involves, to some extent,
borrowing or building on prior work, and it is important to add
information to the public domain, where it is available for use by
others .3 1  But greater reliance on trade secret protection has the
opposite effect. At a minimum, plugging the leaks in trade secret law
by restraining employee movement, chilling second-generation
innovation and reverse engineering, and relying less on patent law
means it would take longer for information to reach the public
domain. If subsequent inventors have to duplicate the work of others
or pay licensing fees for longer periods than they would if the object
was patented, strengthened rights in trade secrets will increase the
cost of innovation. 16 Ultimately, the quantity and quality of
information products may actually decline as the cost of producing
new work increases.
Tracing in this way the likely effect of a powerful new incentive
to use trade secrets is not unduly speculative. At the least, these
predictions seem no more speculative than the underlying assumption
313. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 161 (1989)
(invalidating state law that offered protection tantamount to patent law while avoiding
rigorous requirements of patentability on the ground that such laws were a substantial
threat to the patent system's ability to accomplish its mission of promoting progress in the
useful arts); Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 489 (1974) (noting that if state laws presented a
risk that holders of patentable inventions would not seek patents, the Court would be
compelled to hold that the state system was unconstitutional). In Kewanee and Bonito
Boats, the Court considered state laws, and its calculus might be different were it
considering a federal trade secret law.
314. See Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 494 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that trade
secret protection is a "substantial disincentive" to procuring a patent and "thus deprives
society of the benefits of public disclosure of the invention which it is the policy of the
patent laws to encourage"); see also McManis, supra note 306, at 224 (noting that when
trade secret protection becomes more attractive it can supplant reliance on patent and
copyright protection).
315. See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146 (noting that "imitation and refinement through
imitation are both necessary to invention itself and the very lifeblood of a competitive
economy"); see also Gordon, supra note 209, at 167-68 (noting the synergy of intellectual
life depends upon a vibrant public domain); Landes & Posner, supra note 231, at 332
(noting the importance of prior work in the creative process); David Lange, Recognizing
the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1981, at 147, 178 (observing
that a robust, constantly enriched public domain of material is a good in its own right,
which laws should promote); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965,
passim (1990) (stating that the public domain is a device that permits the system to work).
316. See Landes & Posner, supra note 231, at 332 (explaining how a diminished public
domain ultimately increases the cost of producing new work).
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of those who support increased protection, the assumption that a
legal rule awarding a property interest is necessary to provide an
incentive to create new information products.317 Even if this is so, we
may not need as strong a property interest as advocates have
assumed.1
In sum, the use of criminal law to regulate trade secrets is likely
to chill subsequent innovators, create an incentive to rely on trade
secret protection, decrease public disclosure, and diminish the
amount of information in the public domain. Coupled with the
possibility of lower levels of innovation and competition due to
decreased employee mobility, the EEA may actually reduce
economic well-being.
VI. THE ROLE OF CRIMINAL LAW IN REGULATING USE OF
INFORMATION PRODUCTS
The preceding analysis of trade secret doctrine, the EEA, and its
likely consequences, raises significant doubts about using criminal law
to protect trade secrets 19 The implications that flow from this
317. See Besen & Raskind, supra note 231, at 3 n.1 (expressing doubt about the
efficiency properties of intellectual property law); Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship
and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L. REV. 873, 902-03 (1997) (book review)
(expressing doubt that the Chicago school's emphasis on property "maps well onto
intellectual property" and noting negative implications for public domain).
318. Contrary claims indicate the need for research. See Besen & Raskind, supra note
231, at 24 (noting economic analysis of trade secret protection would illuminate public
policy interests and suggesting research topics).
Many questions remain unanswered. See BOYLE, supra note 216, at 42-45 (noting
the failure of economists to determine whether the market produces too much or too little
information); Lemley, supra note 317, at 877 n.23 (noting that economists have been
unable to determine the effects of commodifying information).
For a summary of pertinent research on the effects of patent law, see Raskind,
supra note 259, at 67-77. A random sample would include Janusz A. Ordover, A Patent
System for Both Diffusion and Exclusion, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 43, passim (1991)
(considering ways of adjusting the patent system to provide returns and encourage
diffusion); Mark Schankerman & Suzanne Scotchmer, Damages and Injunctions in
Protecting Intellectual Property, 32 RAND J. ECON. 199, 219 (2001) (concluding that unjust
enrichment damages may be a superior deterrent to a property rule in certain
circumstances); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative
Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERsP. 29, passim (1991) (analyzing the complex
effects of patent protection when innovation is cumulative); Steven Shavell & Tanguy Van
Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525, passim (2001).
319. The issues identified here do not exhaust the effects and influence of the EEA.
As the first and only federal law that deals with trade secrets in the private sector, the
EEA and the criminal adjudications interpreting it will develop a federal law of trade
secrets. The property emphasis of the EEA is likely to channel development of trade
secret doctrine away from its roots in the law of unfair competition and may lead to
stronger protection by the states. The EEA may also lead states to strengthen their
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conclusion concern the use of criminal law to protect other
information products and raise the prospect of relying on civil law to
protect limited rights in information.
Whether that civil law should be a federal one is a logical follow-
up question. The EEA is a flawed first step in the development of a
federal law of trade secrets. Nevertheless, it may be the catalyst for a
civil federal law of trade secrets that balances more evenly the need
to protect trade secrets with other important public policies and with
the rights of others.
A. Criminal Law and Trade Secrets
Trade secret doctrine is generally based on the view that
interference with a trade secret is a species of unfair competition, and
common law protects limited rights in trade secrets.32° In contrast, the
EEA is based on a property conception 21 The assumptions that flow
from the property designation avoid the need to account for the
limited scope of common law rights in trade secrets. Accordingly, the
EEA expands and strengthens rights in trade secrets by broadening
both the kind of information that is protected and the type of conduct
that is suspect.
3 22
The breadth of potentially protected material, combined with the
use of criminal sanctions, produces a tension with two public policies
and may result in unintended consequences that undermine
Congress's purpose of fostering economic growth.3" As developed
earlier, the EEA is likely to reduce movement of employees among
firms, a possibility that has serious effects on rights of employees and
on prospective employers. In addition, the economic performance of
Silicon Valley shows how a less restrictive legal infrastructure can
encourage regional economic expansion that benefits the general
community. The EEA may also chill second-generation innovation
and lead some innovators to rely less on patent law, which provides a
limited term of protection and requires some disclosure of
information. This result is inconsistent with the public policy that
seeks a balance between encouraging innovation and maintaining
effective use of information and knowledge. The costs of stimulating
criminal laws by broadening coverage and increasing penalties. The view that trade
secrets are property may also subdue consideration of trade secret doctrine. See, e.g.,
Bone, supra note 171.
320. See supra notes 176-213 and accompanying text.
321. See supra notes 244-61 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 126-70 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 262-318 and accompanying text.
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innovation by strengthening rights in secret information may thus
outweigh the benefit of any stimulative effect.
3 4
It is worth considering whether amending the EEA could reduce
or eliminate its negative consequences. To give the EEA's definition
of a trade secret more clarity, the benchmark of secrecy might be
competitors' knowledge of the secret information, rather than the
knowledge of the general public. Congress might also limit the
conduct provisions to a narrower range of acts, such as breach of
confidence, rather than any unauthorized use.32 These changes
ground the offense in unfair competition law and make the EEA
consistent with state laws. To encourage future innovation and to
make clear that such conduct is lawful, a proviso could explicitly
except acts undertaken for the purpose of reverse engineering or
other lawful means of discovery.326 Changes such as these do not
unreasonably divest holders of rights in trade secrets. Rather, they
reflect the traditional limited rights in trade secrets that are consistent
with other existing public policies.
Nevertheless, even if such changes to the EEA were made, it is
doubtful they would overcome the chilling effects on lawful behavior
caused by the threat of federal penal sanctions. Some measure of
ambiguity is inherent in the concept of trade secrets, which depend
upon factors such as an owner's efforts and the commercial value of
the secret. Yet when the subject matter is ill-defined and not
identified until trial, and when the conduct is similar to lawful
competitive practices, some measure of over-deterrence appears
unavoidable.32 7 To paraphrase a Supreme Court observation made
324. Problematic constitutional issues also impose other sorts of costs. See United
States v. Hsu, 40 F. Supp. 2d 623, 625-26 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (raising constitutional vagueness
and due process issues). Another opinion in the same case points to issues involving
criminal law doctrine. See generally United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1998)
(considering attempt, conspiracy, and legal impossibility). Although meaningful
discussion of these issues must necessarily await another day, it is useful to register that
economic harm is not the only unintended consequence of the EEA.
325. This change would bring to the forefront the fundamental issue of when breach of
confidence or contract is sufficiently immoral to justify criminal penalties. See generally
Bone, supra note 171 (concluding that trade secret doctrine is best justified as a contract
matter); Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress:
Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533
(1997) (considering the moral basis for regulatory crimes).
326. See Uhrich, supra note 50, at 186 (proposing an amendment to the EEA that
explicitly permits reverse engineering).
327. Judicial constructions that limit the scope of the statute may not decrease
overdeterrence. See supra note 308 and accompanying text (explaining why a judicial
limitation regarding reverse engineering may not cure overdeterrence).
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with regard to copyright, trade secrets do not "easily equate with
theft."
32
B. The Prospects for Using Criminal Law to Enforce Rights in Other
Information Products
These observations about the EEA and trade secrets are relevant
to the criminal enforcement of rights in other kinds of information
products. One lesson of the EEA is that it is wise to resist using
criminal sanctions to protect products based on information or
knowledge. Although the conclusions drawn as to the EEA will not
always apply with the same force to other contexts,329 the judicious
course is to proceed with a presumption against imposing criminal
penalties. Thus, Congress might reconsider the criminal provisions in
new statutes dealing with copyrights330 and databases.331 A more
constructive strategy is to evaluate the efficacy of such civil provisions
before endorsing criminal sanctions.
If criminal enforcement is eliminated, narrowed, or limited to
egregious cases,332 it becomes necessary for holders of trade secrets to
328. See Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 216-17 (1985). To continue the
analogy to copyright, trade secrets are also not an "ordinary chattel"; a trade secret
"comprises ... [a] delimited interest] to which the [common] law affords correspondingly
exact protections." See id. at 216.
329. For example, the concern with employee mobility may have limited applicability
to material protected by patent and copyright because employers may not profit from use
of such protected material even if it was obtained lawfully. On the other hand, criminal
penalties for copyright infringement raise other issues such as a tension between rights
under copyright law and the First Amendment rights of users.
330. Criminal provisions in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act provide penal
sanctions for devising and publishing methods that circumvent measures taken to protect
copyrighted work against copying. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1202, 1204 (2000); supra note 12
and accompanying text (discussing arrest of Russian programmer).
In 1997, Congress broadened criminal copyright infringement to include
reproducing or distributing within 180 days work exceeding a retail value of $1,000. See
No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997) (codified at 17
U.S.C. § 506(a)(2) (2000)). For useful commentary on changes to criminal copyright
infringement provisions, see generally Lydia Pallas Loren, Digitization, Commodification,
Criminalization: The Evolution of Criminal Copyright Infringement and the Importance of
the Willfulness Requirement, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 835 (1999).
331. Proposed legislation that would protect rights in databases includes a criminal
provision. See H.R. REP. No. 106-349, pt. 1, at 12 (1999) (providing criminal penalties for
willful violations).
332. The standard for determining egregious cases is somewhat problematic. Congress
could condition criminal enforcement upon some minimum loss, although a bright-line
limit may mean some cases of serious harm could not be prosecuted.
An early version of the EEA limited its reach to information that was worth more
than $100,000. See S. REP. No. 104-359, at 15 (1995) (referring to draft bill that applied to
proprietary economic information with a value of at least $100,000). Cf. 18 U.S.C.
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rely on civil law. This course is not without advantages. Civil
remedies, which include punitive damages for willful conduct, are far
less likely to deter legitimate conduct.333 The record of economic
growth indicates that civil remedies appear to motivate adequately
the creation of new products, while not over-compensating in a way
that inhibits long-term innovation and economic growth. Civil
remedies more effectively address the real harm that results when an
information product is taken: the loss of value to its holder. When
information is misappropriated, the original holder still possesses the
information and may continue to use it. Because the owner has lost
only exclusive use of the information, the loss is the diminished value
that follows when others may use it. Civil remedies more precisely
account for this harm because economic loss is a litigated issue? 34 On
the whole, civil law is more likely to produce a nuanced solution that
takes into account the rights of others and the public policy of
promoting efficient use of knowledge and information.
Greater reliance on civil law raises the question of whether that
law should be federal. Recommendations of a federal civil law of
trade secrets have emphasized the need for uniformity and
compliance with international treaties.335  This Article suggests
another reason, that there is some tension between current trade
secret laws and the public policy that supports intellectual property
laws.336 State courts hearing state claims are generally not in a
§ 1030(c) (2000) (providing differential penalties for computer fraud depending on
whether it is a first or second offense); id. § 2319 (b)-(c) (providing penalties for criminal
copyright infringement that depend upon retail value and whether offense is a first one).
333. See Chatterjee, supra note 212, at 898 (arguing that punitive damages would
sufficiently deter others).
334. The problem of measuring diminished value, in both civil and criminal contexts,
merits attention. Estimates of a reasonable royalty or license fee have been criticized as
speculative. Replacement cost based on the victim's original cost may not be appropriate
when present replacement costs are far less than original cost, and a thief's market price
may be too low. See Savage, supra note 56, at 18; see also John T. Cross, Trade Secrets,
Confidential Information, and the Criminal Law, 36 MCGILL L.J. 524, 558 (1991)
(discussing monopoly value); Moohr, supra note 20, at 738 (reviewing problems in
ascertaining value of information); Kent Walker, Federal Criminal Remedies for the Theft
of Intellectual Property, 16 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. LJ. 681, 684 (1994) (noting that the
sentencing guidelines use "retail value," which generally exceeds a defendant's loss or
gain).
335. See Lao, supra note 71, at 1636-39 (reviewing choice of law problems resulting
from lack of uniform law and United States treaty obligations); Pace, supra note 71, at
442-56 (basing recommendation on need for uniformity and international treaties).
336. The Supreme Court in Kewanee reasoned that a conflict between patent and trade
secret law was remote because trade secret law provides "a far weaker protection" than
patent law. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,489-90 (1974); see also Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 155 (1989) (affirming reasoning of
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position to ascertain an inconsistency or to resolve it.337 A carefully
drafted federal civil law of trade secrets could ensure that trade secret
protection is consistent with the public policy underlying intellectual
property laws.
338
This suggestion is not made lightly. It is offered in full
recognition of significant preliminary issues-both doctrinal339 and
political' Q° -that must be resolved and that may, in the end, lead to
foregoing a federal solution. Nevertheless, a considered evaluation of
the proposal would be useful, if only to ascertain whether current
trade secret doctrine and practices have surpassed the rationale that
has allowed the states to guide its development.
CONCLUSION
In enacting the EEA, Congress harnessed two powerful legal
tools-property law and criminal law-to safeguard innovative
information products. But the enhanced property rights in trade
secrets and the powerful threat of criminal sanctions are likely to
produce unintended consequences that undermine public policies
encouraging competition, employee mobility, and the effective use of
information products. Instead of a broad property conception of
trade secrets enforced through penal sanctions, we need a nuanced
conception of trade secrets that accounts for the public policy of
Kewanee). To the extent that trade secret protection has expanded since 1974, that
calculus may now be different.
337. But see Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 515 So.2d 220, 221, 223
(Fla. 1987) (striking down Florida law because it conflicted with federal patent law), affd,
489 U.S. 141 (1989).
338. For example, work by Professor Reichman, focusing on trade secrets that are
eligible for patent protection, presents an integrated analysis of the intellectual property
paradigm and trade secret law. See generally Reichman, supra note 231.
Constitutional consistency may also require attention. See United States v.
Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1279-80 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating that "in some circumstances
the Commerce Clause cannot be used to eradicate a limitation placed upon Congressional
power in another grant of power"), cert. denied 529 U.S. 1036 (2000); Dreyfuss, supra note
246, at 16 n.53 (stating it is unlikely that Supreme Court would allow Congress to avoid
constitutional limitation of limited term for intellectual property by utilizing Commerce
Clause, citing precedent from bankruptcy law).
339. This suggestion includes scrutinizing existing civil law standards and practices to
determine their consistency with intellectual property policy rather than simply
incorporating current standards into federal law.
340. See Lao, supra note 71, at 1695 (recommending a pre-emptive federal trade secret
law in interest of uniformity); Pace, supra note 71, at 468 (concluding that federal
preemption of state trade secret law is necessary to prevent states from "protecting non-
patentable innovations from independent discovery or reverse engineering, or allowing
special protection for innovations generally regarded as being in the public domain").
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maintaining a vibrant public domain and that recognizes the long-
term benefits of using information developed by others.
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